精英阶层再生产与阶层固化程度——以青年的职业地位获得为例

市场转型期,精英阶层的更替过程越来越强调个人能力和高等学历的作用。但这种机制并不排除精英再生产逻辑的运作,政治精英和技术精英都可以将自己的阶层优势传递给下一代。只是精英阶层的再生产规模和阶层固化的程度都是有限的,家庭背景等因素对青年成为精英的作用是基础性的,而不是无限制扩大的。较高学历、中高级职称与高行政级别等阶层身份特征在很大程度上都不具有代际再生产的特性。数据分析表明,在市场转型的头20年里,精英阶层的固化程度还不足以影响社会流动机制的正常运行。     

Elite recruitment and state-society relations in technocratic authoritarian regimes: The Russian case

This article argues that Russia has a peculiar form of authoritarianism that exhibits pronounced technocratic features. The analysis places in a comparative frame the bases of regime legitimacy and the paths to political, administrative, and economic power in Russia. By locating the Russian state in a matrix that considers the ideology of governance on one axis and the backgrounds of elites on the other, the article highlights areas of overlap and separation between state–society relations in Russia and other regimes in the developed and developing world. It also illustrates the ways in which technocratic elites in Russia differ from their counterparts in other parts of the world.     

AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT IN THE FERGHANA VALLEY

The Ferghana valley which is an ethnically and culturally complex region divided among three Central Asian Republics of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, witnessed a number of problems ranging from inter- ethnic tensions to border incursions; from security related complications to a number of socio- economic difficulties in the recent years. Moreover, it is also the most densely populated areas in Central Asia. Though sometimes the threat of religious extremism and intolerance in the Ferghana valley has been exaggerated yet it is difficult to completely deny their presence in the region and the obvious threat it has been posing for the entire Central Asia in future. The artificial delineation of border in the Ferghana valley which was finalized during the soviet era can be considered as one of the principle reasons behind the occurrences of various conflicts in the valley especially after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Similarly, economy also plays a pivotal role in accentuating the conflict in the region as it is found that the root cause of majority of the conflicts prevalent in the region are regarding the domination of a particular ethnic group on the economic resources of that very area. However, the rivalry between the elites of the three republics and their struggle for power also play a prominent role in the disturbances that has been taking place in Ferghana valley as the elites of the valley do not want to lose their predominant position in the newly formed political establishments of their respective republics.     

试析缅甸新商业精英阶层的崛起

1988年以来,随着缅甸新军人政权上台,大部分少数民族武装基本实现停火,新的市场经济导向政策的实施,一个新的社会阶层——商业精英开始形成。精英集团是在特殊时期形成的政治资源与商业资源的结合体,反映了缅甸经济获得一定程度的发展,但它在各个经济领域的垄断排挤了中小民营企业的空间,对缅甸现代化进程造成了不利的影响。     

乌克兰民粹主义的特征及影响(2000-2019年)

乌克兰自独立以来,政治民粹主义伴随其政治经济转型进程不断蔓延加剧。进入21世纪,虽然民粹主义政党和运动出现仅十几年,但乌克兰已然成为后苏联空间中遭遇民粹主义浪潮席卷的突出案例。在经历了2014年的政治危机和持续的顿巴斯冲突后,乌克兰政治逐步进入了民粹主义全面盛行的新阶段。乌克兰民粹主义相较整个欧洲区域具有一些显著的特征,主要表现在:反精英和反建制的极端化,强烈的反民主属性和家长制政府偏好,分裂矛盾的意识形态,过度渲染和营造社会危机,以及盲目的区域一体化期待。究其成因,可归结于该国历史上对统治精英"外来化"的认知,独立后缺乏新的民族国家认知与主流意识形态,"团结主义"的政治文化传统,以及整个社会对阶层分化和等级制度的共识。这种特殊的民粹主义,将对乌克兰政治持续产生一系列负面影响。     

Privatization and elite defection in de facto states: The case of Transnistria, 1991–2012

What factors determine the timing of elite defection in conditions of post-Soviet personalistic presidentialism? How do relations with a powerful patron state affect this process? This article analyzes these questions on the basis of a case study of Transnistria, a de facto state with strong links to Russia. It argues that privatization processes involving actors from the patron state provide a unique opening for elite defection by heightening tensions between the rent-seeking interests of the personalistic president and those of new owners; direct or indirect signals from the patron state may also affect elite's perceptions of incumbent durability and their corresponding decisions.     

Dynastic Politics: Family Ties in the Greek Parliament, 2000–12

Fluctuations in the presence of dynastic politicians in national legislatures are seen as an important indicator of political modernisation. Drawing on original biographical details of Greek Members of Parliament (MPs) from the six most recent parliamentary terms, we document the existence of a substantial and relatively stable pool of dynastic MPs. Their numbers only appear to shrink, albeit not too dramatically, in the 2012 elections, which also marked the collapse of the traditional party system. Findings highlight patterns of stability that have remained unnoticed under more visible shifts in party competition during the economic crisis.     

Who moves? Elite and mass-level depolarization in Britain, 1987–2001

Over the past two decades the British Labour and Conservative parties have depolarized on economic and social welfare policy, at both the elite and mass levels. We ask the question: Does mass-level depolarization in Britain extend throughout the electorate, or is it confined primarily to the stratum of affluent, educated, and politically engaged citizens? We report longitudinal analyses of British Election Study respondents' policy beliefs and partisan loyalties over the period 1987–2001, and find that depolarization extends across all subgroups in the electorate, as do perceptions of elite depolarization. These effects are (moderately) more pronounced among the electoral subgroups of highly educated, affluent, and politically informed citizens. The findings have important implications for elite representation of voters' policy preferences, and for differences in representation patterns between Britain and the United States.     

Russian and Ukrainian elites: A comparative study of different identities and alternative transitions

The deterioration in Russian-Ukrainian relations heightened in 2014 but did not begin then and has deeper roots. Both Russian presidents have had troubled relations with all five Ukrainian presidents irrespective if they were described as ‘nationalist’ or ‘pro-Russian.’ This article is the first to explain why the roots of the crisis go deeper and it does this by investigating three areas. The first is the different sources of elites in 1991 when independent Russia captured Soviet institutions and undertook top-down state building while Ukraine inherited far less and set course with bottom up state-building. The second is divergent Russian and Ukrainian national identities. The third is the resultant different transitions with Russia reverting to great power imperial nationalism and Ukraine quadruple and post-colonial transitions.     

Reflections of the nexus between justice and peacebuilding

This commentary reflects on eight articles recently published in this journal as part of a special issue on the nexus between transitional justice and statebuilding (Volume 10, Issue 3, 2016). It positions the special issue within an emerging ‘fourth phase’ literature on transitional justice that draws on critiques of liberal peacebuilding to urge an expansion of its boundaries to embrace socio-economic issues. It is argued that the type of analysis found in the special issue, characterized by in-depth, on-the-ground empirical analysis of complex domestic politics of material accumulation and ideological contestation, marks a significant and welcome advance in a literature which to this point has been largely de-contextualized, exhortatory and over-reliant on tired binaries of the ‘international and the local’ or the ‘liberal and legitimate’.