排序方式: 共有2条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1
1.
Michael J. Cohen 《中东研究》2017,53(6):865-878
During World War One, both Arabs and Zionists sought to become “the tools of British imperialism.” The British exploited both as their own interests dictated, without giving a thought for future consequences. In 1915, the MacMahon-Husayn correspondence – conducted between Britain's High Commissioner in Cairo and a non-representative Arab Bedouin leader from the Arabian Peninsula – ended inconclusively, without agreement. In contrast, the Balfour Declaration - the culmination of 6 months of British-initiated negotiations with the Zionists, was published in order to further Britain's military, strategic and propaganda interests. At the time, the British considered it to have been a ‘brilliant coup’. 相似文献
2.
William Anthony Hay 《Diplomacy & Statecraft》2002,13(3):57-80
Imperial security and the need to contain Germany drove British policy towards Austria-Hungary during the First World War more than its view of the Dual Monarchy itself, and shifts in the course of that policy reflected the changing fortunes of war. Given its strategic interests, Britain had less scope to sustain Austria as a great power than Paul W. Schroeder has argued. Those priorities also limited the role of specialists like R.W. Seton-Watson and Sir Lewis Namier to advising on the implementation of policies made by the war cabinet rather than shaping decisions themselves. Development of wartime policy towards Austria cast the priority Britain placed on Central and Eastern Europe into sharp relief, helping to explain trends in its approach to the region through the 1940s. 相似文献
1