ANC foreign policy making during the Mbeki period: More democratic or less?

The African National Congress, as an entity distinct from government, served during the 1994–2008 period as an independent forum for debate about South Africa's foreign policy, particularly in the National Executive Committee's Subcommittee on International Relations. This debate retained the oligarchic character of the movement in exile, with few voices – Thabo Mbeki's most prominent among them – dominating the discussion, inputs from subnational party structures almost non-existent, and dissenters expected to keep quiet publicly. That said, participants in these discussions largely dismissed characterisations of Mbeki as a dictator in the foreign policy debate, noting that the predominance of his views stemmed mostly from his strong argumentation and knowledge rather than bullying. Senior ANC leaders also claimed that limited interest in foreign policy, outside of national party structures, hindered efforts to broaden participation in foreign policy formulation.     

Mbeki's African Renaissance Vision as Reflected in isiXhosa Written Poetry: 2005–2011

IsiXhosa literary critics have not yet interrogated literature that was produced during and after the tenure of Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki as deputy president and president of the Republic of South Africa in order to study the impact of his African Renaissance doctrine. This article analyses poetry that was produced from 2005 to 2011. The content of the isiXhosa written poetry is profoundly influenced by the context of former President Mbeki's African Renaissance philosophy, its implementation structures and philosophy of self-confidence and self-reliance. The selected poems analysed and interpreted in this article suggest that Mbeki's legacy of the African Renaissance empowered poets to develop a narrative that advances the building of a regenerated South African nation and the African continent. Selected poetry of the period is contextualised, and the findings reveal that the poets have a dialectical relationship with historical developments of the time, and that they demonstrate acquiescence to the African Renaissance ideology, and support the operational structures created; namely African Union, Pan-African Parliament and the Vuk’uzenzele programme.     

THE RENAISSANCE FACTOR IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF AFRICAN REGIONAL GOVERNANCE (1999-2008)

ABSTRACT

This article examines a likely South African hegemony in Africa between 1999 and 2008. Hegemony is admittedly difficult to define in African regionalism studies, as it is counter intuitive to Pan-Africanism discourse. However, this article aims to show that hegemony can be a credible argument in explaining the South African driven changes that occurred in African regionalism between 1999 and 2008. The article locates key characteristics which underpin arguments of South African hegemony during the study timeline. It argues that Thabo Mbeki's governance philosophy of African renaissance was the central piece of South African Africa foreign policy that distinguishes this period from any other before or after it. By establishing hegemonic credibility in South Africa's interaction with Africa in this period, the article demonstrates how South Africa was able to contribute to transformational governance changes in Africa. This also holds lessons for South African regional ascendancy in the future.     

The African renaissance and the Caribbean

In May 2010 South African President Jacob Zuma will have been in office for one year. During this time, the Zuma administration has been far less ambitious in its foreign policy than previous administrations. However, South Africa is not in a position where it is able to withdraw from foreign engagement, as regional issues — such as Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Swaziland — continue to demand attention. The Zuma administration's approach in the future, in terms of both substance and style, will need to be informed by lessons from past engagement, including South African peacekeeping efforts in countries such as the DRC and Burundi, and South African mediation efforts in countries such as Angola, Côte d'Ivoire and the Comoros. Certainly, South Africa's record of success in taking on international responsibilities over the past 10 years has been mixed, but there is scope for past experience to shape future engagement positively. Indications of this can be seen, for example, in Zuma's efforts to redress former President Thabo Mbeki's clumsy mediation efforts in Angola by deciding to make his first state visit as South Africa's president to Luanda. Zuma's approach to Zimbabwe could build on the foundation set by Mbeki's long engagement with that country.     

NEPAD: Talking from the South,governing from the West

The formation of the New Partnership for African Development (NePAD) in 2001 at the African Union (AU) Summit in Lusaka, Zambia, marked the advent of what is regarded as a novel development strategy crafted by Africans for Africa. Rooted in former South African President thabo Mbeki’s call for an African renaissance, the initiative seeks to trigger the continent’s economic development by encouraging African states to explore the prevailing international economic order or globalisation. this article explores NePAD’s capacity to foster economic development in Africa, assesses the reasons for its establishment, reviews its mandate and examines institutional mechanisms for achieving its goals. the article takes issue with the ‘westernisation’ of the ‘discourse’ of Africa and calls for the revitalisation of NePAD’s strategy for sustainable African development.     

South African foreign policy in the post-Mbeki period

President Thabo Mbeki's resignation in September 2008 six months before the expected end of his term was triggered by the recall issued by the ANC National Executive Committee. It is highly unlikely that any major changes in foreign policy will be made by the caretaker government of President Kgalema Motlanthe before the 2009 elections. However, the significant changes in the domestic political environment signal the start of a new era in South Africa's transformation — what might be called the ‘post post-apartheid period’. This paper explores what those changes might entail, especially in the realm of foreign policy. After reflecting on the legacy of Mbeki's foreign policy, the paper considers the potential implications of the relevant resolutions agreed at the December 2007 ANC National Conference in Polokwane. Constraints on South African foreign policy towards the African continent are considered, especially with regard to perception versus reality of its economic and political hegemony as well as its complex identity as a nation. In light of this analysis and the inevitable impact of the current global economic crisis, the paper concludes with a series of recommendations for a new vision and agenda for South Africa's foreign policy under the government to be elected in 2009.     

The curious career of an African modernizer: South Africa's Thabo Mbeki

Thabo Mbeki, South Africa's second democratically elected president, was born into left-wing politics. In exile, he became the face of the African National Congress (ANC) and developed a reputation as a modernizer. He returned to the country and built relations, not with the ANC's internal allies, but with the country's business community. In 1996, as Mandela's deputy, Mbeki implemented a neo-liberal economic package, called GEAR, which alienated many. In office, he both failed to acknowledge the threat of HIV/AIDS to the country and refused to pressure the failing regime in Zimbabwe; but it was his bypassing of parliament that ultimately led to his failure as president.     

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South Africa's status and prestige as a country that successfully and unilaterally disarmed its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programme enabled it to engage with the Saddam government of Iraq in the months leading up to the US-led invasion of March 2003. Following intense international diplomatic efforts, Saddam Hussein had agreed to allow UN and International Atomic Energy Agency weapons inspectors to enter Iraq in November 2002. Acting outside the UN Security Council, the US and its coalition partners maintained that Iraq continued to maintain and produce WMD, a claim refuted by weapons inspectors, including a South African disarmament team that visited Iraq in February 2003. Employing three diplomatic strategies associated with niche diplomacy, South Africa contributed to attempts to avert the invasion by assisting with the orderly disarmament of Saddam-led Iraq and by practising multilateralism. These strategies, notwithstanding the US-led invasion signalling a failure of South Africa's niche diplomacy in this instance, provide valuable insight into the nuclear diplomacy of South Africa.     

Executive overstretch: South African broadcasting independence and accountability under Thabo Mbeki

Abstract

In this article I examine the extent of the South African broadcasting sector's independence and accountability since Thabo Mbeki became president in 1999. I trace how the independence of two institutions – the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (Icasa) and the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) – has been eroded over this period. While initially the government justified this erosion as being necessary to attain developmental objectives in the context of a globalising economy, more lately there have been attempts to justify greater state control of content. Icasa has been subjected to greater direct executive control, and there are attempts to intensify this control, while the executive exercises indirect control over the SABC. Greater accountability to the state has been accompanied by a decline in public accountability. I conclude by arguing that the experiences with Icasa and the SABC give credence to the argument made by several international NGOs that media freedom in South Africa is declining, in spite of official protestations to the contrary. I also argue that this control has damaged the integrity of these institutions, and that this integrity must be restored now that Mbeki's presidency is coming to an end.     

Understanding South Africa's foreign policy: the perplexing case of Zimbabwe

Many who have admired the African National Congress are confused and dismayed by post-apartheid South Africa's foreign policy on human rights and good governance, exemplified by its most important policy test to date, viz. Zimbabwe. It is argued below that understanding this policy in terms of the widely-used explanation that it represents ‘a shift from idealism to realism’ is unsatisfactory. This state-centric framework, focused on ‘national’ interests and ideals cannot accommodate the wide range of interests, ideals, and other factors that shape the policy. Instead, this investigation assumes that all foreign policies involve a close interaction between ‘realism’ (interest-driven analysis) and ‘idealism’ (beliefs/values-driven analysis). In addition to exploring this interaction, this paper also touches briefly and tentatively on the following questions: how well has South Africa's foreign policy been calculated and implemented, and what have been its effects and consequences for South Africa, Zimbabwe, and the ‘progressive’ international norms to which both South Africa and many of its critics subscribe. A subsidiary aim is to clarify some misunderstandings between South Africa and the West that frequently lead to their ‘talking past each other’ on this, and other, issues of human rights and good governance.