Instituting Peace: Third Party Principles and the Mitchell Effect

Abstract

The notion of legitimacy in international peacebuilding is an assumed one; there is an expectation that the formal, Weberian state institutions advanced therein will automatically be condoned by those in whose name they are delivered. But such bodies have, since at least colonial times, been suspect in many postconflict spaces and have routinely been ignored, resisted and bypassed when their local propriety does not reflect social preferences, and the empirical evidence does not suggest this pattern has stopped. The persistence of this null legitimacy derives from the exclusionary nature of liberal interventionism, which neither seeks local knowledge from which to design institutions nor considers their requirements important in relation to popular legitimacy. This article uses survey data drawn from Southern Sudan to discuss how legitimacy is seen from within and what it might look like.     

The Fall and Rise of State Capabilities in the Management of the UK Nuclear Legacy

In 2015 and 2017, two large contracts for nuclear decommissioning were terminated early by the UK Government. Rather than re-tender, Government took direct ownership and control of Sellafield and began an inquiry into other sites’ management. The problems with the contract model for management of the UK’s nuclear legacy stem from an inability to adequately specify contracts in uncertain environments. The embrace of management and operations contracts for all sites after nationalized ownership limited the range of “tools” to manage the nuclear legacy. This highlights the role of state capabilities alongside incentivized private sector relationships in contemporary governance.