Aid and state-building,Part I: South Korea and Taiwan

Under what conditions does foreign aid in the aftermath of war foster state-building? This article argues that institutional legacy and continuity and the politics of aid may matter. In the aftermath of war, for an aid regime to reinforce state-building, it may need to ensure continuity in the strength of the state and to use recipient mechanisms and finance policies that generate a greater state capacity. The existence and continuity of a Weberian state may increase the likelihood of effective state-building. If the state is relatively strong, with a Weberian bureaucracy, aid can further reinforce it when aid is spent through national systems or is aligned with local priorities, with efforts to ensure that the recipient leaders reinforce state effectiveness by implementing policies that may require greater state capacity. Evidence for this argument is provided through pairwise comparison of state-building patterns between South Korea and Taiwan.     

Domestic elites and external actors in post-conflict democratisation: mapping interactions and their impact

Abstract

Following the end of the Cold War, post-conflict democratisation has rarely occurred without a significant international involvement. This contribution argues that an explanation of the outcomes of post-conflict democratisation requires more than an examination of external actors, their mission mandates or their capabilities and deficiencies. In addition, there is a need to study domestic elites, their preferences and motivations, as well as their perceptions of and their reactions to external interference. Moreover, the patterns of external–internal interactions may explain the trajectory of state-building and democracy promotion efforts. These issues deserve more attention from both scholars and practitioners in the fields of peace- and state-building, democracy promotion, regime transition and elite research. Analyses of external actors and domestic elites in post-conflict democratisation should therefore address three principal issues: (1) the identification of relevant domestic elites in externally induced or monitored state-building and democratisation processes, (2) the dynamics of external–domestic interactions and (3) the impact of these interactions on the outcomes of post-conflict democratisation.     

The demise of the intervention paradigm—resilience thinking in the Merida Initiative

Post-Cold War interventions have gone through a series of distinct paradigms—each allowing for its own oppositional discourse. This possibility seems to be diminishing with the rise of resilience thinking. In the early 1990s, liberal internationalist framings drove intervention by prioritising individual human rights over state rights to non-interference. Here, it was possible to oppose intervention as illegal boundary violation and unaccountable foreign rule. Neo-liberal approaches circumvented the legal problematic by conflating sovereignty with the capacity for good governance. However, they depended on a strong sociocultural dichotomy, giving rise to accusations of neo-colonialism. In contrast, the resilience discourse emphasises the positive, transformative aspects of local agency, rather than seeing it as deficient and needing paternal guidance. This paper argues that by claiming to merely plus up already existing social practices, international policy engagement in the Global South becomes difficult to conceive as boundary transgression or hierarchical imposition. These insights are drawn out with reference to the Merida Initiative, a US-Mexican security agreement signed in 2007.     

Explaining Myanmar's regime transition: the periphery is central

In 2010, Myanmar (Burma) held its first elections after 22?years of direct military rule. Few compelling explanations for this regime transition have emerged. This article critiques popular accounts and potential explanations generated by theories of authoritarian “regime breakdown” and “regime maintenance”. It returns instead to the classical literature on military intervention and withdrawal. Military regimes, when not terminated by internal factionalism or external unrest, typically liberalize once they feel they have sufficiently addressed the crises that prompted their seizure of power. This was the case in Myanmar. The military intervened for fear that political unrest and ethnic-minority separatist insurgencies would destroy Myanmar's always-fragile territorial integrity and sovereignty. Far from suddenly liberalizing in 2010, the regime sought to create a “disciplined democracy” to safeguard its preferred social and political order twice before, but was thwarted by societal opposition. Its success in 2010 stemmed from a strategy of coercive state-building and economic incorporation via “ceasefire capitalism”, which weakened and co-opted much of the opposition. Having altered the balance of forces in its favour, the regime felt sufficiently confident to impose its preferred settlement. However, the transition neither reflected total “victory” for the military nor secured a genuine or lasting peace.     

Symbolic state-building in contemporary Russia

Vladimir Putin has made state-building a central goal of his presidency and recent scholarship has demonstrated that Russian formal institutions have indeed been deliberately reformed. Unlike studies that ass’ess state-building vis-à-vis a particular outcome, our research examines what kind of state Russian political elites seek to build, and focuses on symbolic state-building strategies. To capture symbolic state-building in the Putin era, we examine the Pryamaya Liniya broadcasts: annual, high-profile TV broadcasts in which citizens pose questions to the president. We find that a broad range of formal institutions appear to be central to Putin’s state-building project, a finding that runs counter to claims that governance is largely deinstitutionalized, informal and personal. We argue that symbolic state-building seeks to reconcile personalism and institutionalism, by conveying a dual image of a state in citizens’ everyday lives – emphasizing both formal institutions, while also affirming Putin as the personal guarantor of the state’s authority.     

Theorising state–narco relations in Bolivia’s nascent democracy (1982–1993): governance,order and political transition

Conventional policy and academic discourses have generally held illicit drug economies in Latin America to be synergistic with violence and instability. The case of post-transition Bolivia (1982–1993) confounds such assumptions. Applying a political economy approach, this article moves beyond mainstream analyses to examine how the Bolivian drug trade became interwoven with informal forms of governance, order and political transition. I argue that state–narco networks – a hangover from Bolivia’s authoritarian era – played an important role in these complex processes. In tracing the evolution of these interactions, the article advances a more nuanced theorisation of the relationship between the state and the drug trade in an understudied case.     

Does the sequence of land reform and political reform matter? Evidence from state-building in Afghanistan

Property insecurity is associated with terrorism, insurgency and economic underdevelopment. For this reason, land reform is often implemented alongside political reform in post-conflict settings. In contrast, this article argues that political reform should be sequenced prior to land reform during state-building. Evidence from Afghanistan shows how land redistribution, legal titling, decentralisation of state-owned land and provision of legal services to resolve land disputes are unlikely to alleviate political violence or facilitate economic development without establishing or substantially improving political capacity, political constraints and inclusive political institutions at the local level. These findings suggest the importance of sequence in the process of land reform and political reform. More generally, political reform is a prerequisite for land reform to reduce violence and improve development prospects in post-conflict settings.     

Democratization,State-building and War: The Cases of Serbia and Croatia

The author explores the connection that exists between democratization, state-building and war in the cases of Serbia and Croatia in the 1990s. It is necessary to examine closely how these processes influence one another because state-building and democratization are not necessarily contradictory and even war might not be an obstacle for democracy. However, in Serbia and Croatia state-building and war influenced democratization negatively, but in different ways. In Serbia, the nationalist mobilization for a state-building programme prevented democratization, while in Croatia democratization was a precondition for state-building, which then impeded democratic consolidation. Further important differences are the lower level of institutionalization, incomplete state-building, and polarized party system in Serbia and a higher level of institutionalization, completed state-building, and moderate party pluralism in Croatia. The war also influenced Croatia directly, while Serbia was only indirectly affected by the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina before the NATO intervention in 1999.     

Construction Jihad: state-building and development in Iran and Lebanon’s Shiʿi Territories

Abstract

Based on fieldwork in Iran and Lebanon, this article compares the Iranian reconstruction and development organisation Construction Jihad with its Hizbullah-affiliated subsidiary in Lebanon. Beyond shedding light on Iranian and Lebanese history and politics, this comparison offers insight into the transnational diffusion of a development organisation by a state actor to its non-state or quasi-state ‘client’ in the Muslim and developing world. Despite the distinct environmental and operational conditions of Iran and Lebanon, Construction Jihad similarly assisted a nascent Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) and a fledgling Hizbullah with state-building. The latter consisted of consolidating coercive power against domestic and foreign opponents, increasing administrative capacity through service provision and post-war reconstruction, and strengthening the political and religious identity of citizens and constituents. Regardless of the differing contexts of Iran and Lebanon, Construction Jihad counter-intuitively possessed a similar organisational and developmental model in both countries that did not neatly conform to the dichotomous typologies in development studies. This seemingly contradictory model was largely faith based, exclusive, distributive and top down with certain decentralised, community driven and participatory elements.     

Sub-State Diplomacy in Malfunctioning States: The Case of the Republika Srpska,Bosnia and Herzegovina

Diplomacy is no longer the preserve of the state. It is increasingly used by sub-state actors to contest state-level authority. In malfunctioning states like Bosnia and Herzegovina, where lengthy state-building efforts have not alleviated the risk of instability, this possibility is a cause for concern. This article builds on paradiplomatic and state-building studies to examine specific aspects of the Republika Srpska's (RS) bid for diplomatic actorness. Based on the content analysis of official documents and interviews, it assesses the level of diplomatic actorness of the RS in four dimensions (legal authority, external presence, internal presence, autonomy) and examines whether this has grown in collaboration or competition with state-level diplomacy. The article shows that the development of the RS's paradiplomatic activities is driven by ethno-political competition, facilitated by state and sub-state actors’ mutual disregard, and that it both echoes and amplifies the systemic malfunctioning of Bosnia and Herzegovina.