Bushwhacking the Democratic Peace

The invasion of Iraq has been justified, ex post , as for the purpose of promoting the democratic peace. It does not, however, appear to have been a principal goal ex ante . Most democratic peace theorists, moreover, do not endorse democratic regime change by great-power external military intervention. Success is difficult to achieve (usually at high cost), and the conditions in Iraq were not promising even had the occupation been carried out more competently. Greater success in democratization has been achieved by UN peacekeeping operations, and by various regional international organizations using a variety of peaceful measures to ensure free elections, constrain authoritarian leaders, and empower democratic forces. International organizations, notably those whose membership is largely composed of democracies, are especially likely to succeed in promoting democracy.     

Can the Democrats Win Again?

After losing two successive elections, debate has raged within the Democratic party over how to win back power without comprising the principles which the party has long stood for. This article explores the reasons why the Democrats were unable to defeat George W. Bush in 2004, despite the numerous problems of the incumbent' first term, and asks what lessons the Democrats can learn from their defeat. The second half of the article focuses on what issues and policies the Democrats should concentrate and what strategies the party should adopt in order to improve its image and broaden its popular appeal ahead of the 2008 election.     

NATO: The United States, Transformation and the War in Afghanistan

During the Bush years, NATO exhibited in stark form two trends which have long characterised its development: periodic exposure to crisis and division, and a subordination to American leadership. Despite signs of American indifference towards the alliance, talk of the Bush administration levering a break with NATO was always overstated, particularly so during its second term of office. Views of NATO after 2004 were shaped by Afghanistan giving rise, in fact, to a return to the alliance on America's part. NATO remains important to Bush's successor but on terms which are as demanding as those of his predecessors. NATO, in other words, is valued in so far as it accords with current US foreign policy priorities. The safest assumption in this regard is that Obama will continue to favour the trend towards a global NATO pursued by the Bush administration. However, retreat (or defeat) in Afghanistan could hasten a contrary trend towards a consolidating NATO with a renewed concentration on the wider Europe.     

Bush: The Sequel

This article examines the likely foreign policy initiatives of the U.S. under the leadership of George W. Bush. The new president has outlined a fairly thorough critique of America's international behavior in the 1990s. Because a leader's public statements arguably serve to persuade various audiences and to build support for policy change, the article takes Bush's words quite seriously—along with those spoken or written by his closest foreign affairs advisors. Bush intends to abandon the so-called Clinton Doctrine and deploy national missile defenses. He is critical of American policies toward China and Russia, but has not presented bold new initiatives toward those powers. Under the rubric of "compassionate conservatism," Bush may alter U.S. relations toward the Global South in some interesting ways. The president and his advisors often purport to be realists, but the article demonstrates that their own words belie this claim as they often justify policies based on ideals rather than the pursuit of power.     

The moral purpose of US power: neoconservatism in the age of Obama

The ‘neoconservative moment’ is widely assumed to have come and gone with the George W. Bush administration. This article argues, however, that the hope that the neoconservative chapter in US foreign policy will be definitively closed under Barack Obama's administration is unlikely to be realized in practice, owing to the continuing influence that neoconservatives are able to exercise over national debates regarding the ‘moral’ use of US power in order to shape the international environment. While the moral agenda of the ‘neocons’ is often misconceived as simply a mask for the naked pursuit of the United States' material and strategic interests, this article demonstrates that this misrepresents the rationale that underpins the neoconservative perspective. Exploring the re-articulation of morality in neoconservative thought reveals the nexus that both links the neoconservative domestic agenda for political change to its foreign policy goals and also provides a framework for understanding the ‘staying power’ that neoconservatism continues to exhibit. Although the Obama presidency is widely heralded as a repudiation of this agenda, the neoconservative conception of the United States as a moral power is deeply rooted in US foreign policy traditions and is domestically allied to traditional expressions of social conservatism, which enables neoconservative ideas to continue to resonate in US foreign policy debates.     

With friends like these: foreign policy as personal relationship

Governments are run by humans who have sympathies and moods. The study of leaders' personalities, albeit not widespread, is an important tool for foreign policy analysis. Plus, friendship is a feeling that decision-makers like to express for each other. This paper analyses the activity of Silvio Berlusconi, Italy's three times premier, who has made ‘friendship’ a central tenet of his personal foreign policy. Three cases are considered, namely, Berlusconi's relationship with George W. Bush, Tony Blair and Vladimir Putin. The paper concludes that his friendship-based foreign policy has somehow worked; but, because he decided to ignore Italy's structural constraints in the international arena, he ended up wasting opportunities and resources.     

Cross-Currents: Elizabeth von Arnim,Max Beerbohm and George Bernard Shaw

Abstract

When Elizabeth von Arnim’s novel Introduction to Sally appeared in 1926, the critical response was divided. Dame Ethel Smyth may have told von Arnim the book was her ‘masterpiece’ but some were less convinced; the reviewer in Punch, for instance, considered it ‘a coarse-grained fantasy’. By situating Introduction to Sally in a wider literary context that includes Max Beerbohm’s Zuleika Dobson (1911 Beerbohm, Max (1964a), ‘To Reggie Turner, 3 November 1911’, in Rupert Hart-Davis (ed.), Letters to Reggie Turner, London: Davis, p. 126. [Google Scholar]) and George Bernard Shaw’s Pygmalion (1914 Shaw, George Bernard (1914), ‘Pygmalion: A Romance in Five Acts’, Everybody’s Magazine, Vol xxxi, (5). [Google Scholar]), this article explores the personal connections between these three authors and the thematic cross-currents in these texts. Is von Arnim’s novel really as ‘coarse’ and ‘vulgar’ as some earlier critics suggest? Or is it a novel that successfully mixes the plausible with the artificial, the comic and the socially catastrophic, in ways that, more than a decade later, resonate with the work of her friends to highlight several continuing preoccupations?     

布什政府对东盟的政策及其对中国的影响

本文总结了布什执政以来美国对东盟的政策,探讨了影响美国政策的因素,分析了美国对东盟政策的调整将对中国—东盟关系产生的影响。文章认为,“9.11”事件以后,美国的反恐战争为其重返东南亚提供了契机。布什政府调整了对这一地区的政策,改善或提升了与东盟国家的关系。然而,把东盟作为一个地区机制,美国还没有完整的战略。美国主要推进的是双边关系,其中以军事关系为重。美国政策对中国的影响是复杂的,在中美关系稳定的情况下,其负面影响在短期内不会太大。     

理想主义、保守主义与布什政府的进攻性民主扩展战略

理想主义和保守主义在人类本性、世界观和历史观、意识形态、思维方式等方面存在交叉或重合,但在改造世界的方式以及对权力政治的态度等方面也存在明显的差异。由于理想主义和保守主义在理论上具有交叉,它们可以融为一体,相互促进。受新保守派的影响,布什政府的民主扩展战略成为理想主义和保守主义的混合物,既有理想主义激情,又有保守主义的态度。正是这种理念的混合使得布什政府的民主扩展战略呈现出咄咄逼人的进攻性特点。     

Trump the antisemantic,and the boundaries of populism

ABSTRACT

In this article I consider Donald Trump as an “antisemantic” president, and link antisemanticism to broader forms of populism. Drawing on Stuart Hall’s analysis of Thatcherism, I explore the political and discursive domains as intrinsically linked in the Trumpian moment. Second, I turn to a theory of the antisemantic, showing its difference from the Orwellian universe. Where the Orwellian model depends on the inversion of meanings, the Trumpian paradigm (“Truth isn’t truth”) attacks the foundations of meaning itself. In the Trumpian age the internet also acts as a dark multiplier, thinning out meaning through its distortions and profusion. As counterpart to these patterns, I show how the antisemantic rests on certain symbolic fixities, especially around boundaries and the “uber” symbol of the wall. I end with some notes on how to reconstruct a sense of accountability in meaning, and to think of boundaries that are transitive and generative rather than singular and walled.