Islamist Versus Islamist: Rising Challenge in Gaza

Islam's diversity is a direct result of centuries of schism and factionalism, and presents a challenge to the original spirit of unity as envisaged by its founder, the Prophet Mohammed. Rivalry within Islam undermines the precedent notion of unity through communal belonging (tawhid and ummah). Yet in the twenty-first century this diversity is ignored, and political Islam is represented as being more of a monolith than a spectrum of ideas and aspirations. Generally, the materialization of new Islamist groups is a challenge to those who hold that unity is all. In the Gaza Strip, specifically, the dominant Islamist actor, Hamas, is facing internal challenges from other Islamist elements. These rival Islamists are also influenced by events across their border in post-revolutionary Egypt where a plethora of new Islamist actors are vying for political space and power. This article deals with Hamas's Islamist rivals, and the effects they have had on Hamas's governance of the Gaza Strip, and political and religious legitimacy within it. It will focus on ideological and violent disputes between the Islamist elements in Gaza, and the means by which Hamas and its security elements have tackled newly emerging rivals.     

The Isolated Islamists: The Case of the Allied Democratic Forces in the Ugandan-Congolese Borderland

This study investigates the absence of substantive linkages between locally based Salafi Jihadist movements and their more transnational counterparts such as Al-Qaeda or ISIS. While studies have addressed the heterogeneity in Jihadi alliances, the question of why inter-Jihadi ties are completely absent or tenuous at times is under-theorized in the literature. Given ISIS’s recent inexorable advance through the Middle East and North Africa and its ever-growing ties with local Jihadists, it is timely to investigate under what conditions locally based militant Islamists are less likely to forge ties with global Jihadists. Using the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)—a militant Islamist group in the Ugandan-Congolese borderland—as an illustrative case study, the research sheds light on conditions under which inter-Jihadi ties are less likely. These include the extent of ideological divergence between local and global Jihadists, the degree of relevance to the local community, and the fear of attracting new enemies in the form of more stringent counter-terrorism operations.     

The limit-experience and self-deradicalisation: the example of radical Salafi youth in Tunisia

This article gives an example of self-deradicalisation from Tunisia. It addresses the potential of radicalised individuals to de-radicalise themselves from within the Salafi doctrine with no external interventions, in comparison with the state’s religious rehabilitation approaches to tackling radicalism which not only fail but are also counterproductive. Deradicalisation could, of course, involve a more comprehensive rejection of Salafi ideology. This article suggests that an effective type of deradicalisation that is more likely to make the desired change possible is one in which there is a gradual modification of some attitudes and behaviours without abandoning the whole underpinning Salafi ideology. Referring to the personal narratives of 28 individual Tunisian Salafis, the article identifies phases of radicalisation and deradicalisation as the individual voluntarily moves from embracing radical ideology to a more critical understanding and practice reflecting on personal and interpersonal experiences of being radicalised. The research shows that the process of self-deradicalisation is reflective of Salafi youth experience of engagement with radicalism and is more likely to happen in societies that allow political expression and individual freedom that invoke individuals’ critical thinking.