The 2019 General Election in Northern Ireland: the Rise of the Centre Ground?

The experience of the 2019 general election in Northern Ireland took a very different course to that of the rest of the UK and, indeed, to the pattern of electoral politics typical of the region. Coming after almost three years with no functioning devolved government, combined with intense disagreement and uncertainty about Brexit, voters were ready to give a message to the two largest parties. Both Sinn Féin and the DUP suffered losses in the election, with the headline outcome being that unionism no longer holds the majority of seats for Northern Ireland in Westminster. More generally, there was a swing from both sides towards centre ground voting, which brought significant gains for the Alliance Party and the SDLP. This article summarises the reasons for this broad trend, focussing on the conditions and electoral pacts which brought it about. It also considers what it might mean for the prospects for Irish unification, noting that a referendum on unification will only be passed by attracting votes from those who tend to see themselves as neither unionist or nationalist.     

Does Moderation Pay in a Consociational Democracy? The Marginalisation of the SDLP in the North of Ireland

A central question in the debate between “centripetalists” and “consociationalists” concerns whether power‐sharing arrangements provide incentives for moderation. This article helps to formulate an empirical answer through an examination of the electoral decline of the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) following the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) in the North of Ireland. Drawing on primary qualitative interviews with key players, this article argues that the SDLP were electoral losers under a system of ethnic out‐flanking. Sinn Féin has successfully presented itself as the “greener” and more robust representative of nationalist interests, whilst simultaneously moderating its message and operating the institutions of Northern Ireland. Sinn Féin has taken ownership of the GFA and has positioned itself as the party best able to ensure its delivery. Sinn Féin’s rights‐based agenda, and vibrant electoral machine, has resonated with the nationalist electorate who are less sure of what the contemporary SDLP stands for.     

‘No‐one likes us; we don't care’: ‘Dissident’ Irish Republicans and Mandates

The episodic dissident republican activity evident in Northern Ireland since the Good Friday Agreement has been accompanied by regular assertions from the police, politicians and commentators that dissidents have no backing. This article examines the historic importance of mandates and support for previous and contemporary republican armed campaigns. It explores whether violent republicans have ever enjoyed widespread support in Ireland and assesses the extent to which a lack of backing has precluded violent campaigns. The piece analyses the evidence regarding the lack of sympathy for current dissident violence, assessing the degree to which armed republicanism has reached a new level of isolation.     

Terrorism and Terrorist Leaders: Insights from Developmental and Ecological Psychology

A recent increase in terrorist actions where the terrorist's death is planned and intentional has raised interest in the psychological functioning, motivation, and reasoning of those who engage in terrorism and those who support it. No consensus exists among Western ¹ 1. That is, American or European. psychologists regarding terrorists who plan to die in their attack, and no Western psychological perspective has thus far contributed substantively to explaining or predicting it. Although most agree that groups engaging in such actions typically have a wider network of support, the psychology of supporters is also unexplained. This article proposes a developmental psychological model of the conditions that favor focused terrorist actions that have publicly discernible goals ascribed to a political or religious cause. The article describes a common pattern of cognitive complexity among terrorist leaders, using Osama bin Laden as a model, where entrenched cognitive simplicity in one key ideological domain (religious or political) is coupled with behavior reflecting the capacity for far greater complexity in other domains (organizational skills, planning, problem-solving.) This pattern, in specifiable historical and ecological context, makes terrorist tactics, including those in which the attacker intentionally dies, more likely, and increases the challenges associated with attempts at diplomacy or negotiated peace.     

Monitoring the Peace?: Northern Ireland's 1975 Ceasefire Incident Centres and the Politicisation of Sinn Féin

During the Provisional IRA's (PIRA) 1975 ceasefire, two different sets of incident centres were established across Northern Ireland in order to monitor and avert escalation of violence between Republicans and Security Forces. While one group of offices was run by the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) and administered by clerks in the Northern Ireland Civil Service, very quickly Sinn Féin (taking advantage of their decriminalisation in 1974) established their own incident centres to coordinate their communication with the government. This article argues that the establishment of the Sinn Féin incident centres set a precedent for the future political activity of the Provisional Republican Movement; that their activity during the 1975 ceasefire played an important formative role in the evolution of the group's political strategy; and that this experience, acquired from the work done during the 1975 truce, was of far greater influence than is appreciated in current accounts.     

Mainstream Revolutionaries: Sinn Féin as a “Normal” Political Party?

Despite the seismic shift of Sinn Féin from being the “mouthpiece” of the Provisional Irish Republican Army to the largest nationalist force in Northern Ireland, the party continues to project its objectives within the revolutionary politics and tradition of 1916. Whilst various groups across the island of Ireland stress their loyalty to Irish independence and allegiance to their republican forefathers, 2016 also plays host to devolved assembly elections in Northern Ireland. The centenary of the Easter Rising is therefore a poignant moment to reassess republican politics, more specifically, the relationship between the armed revolutionary tradition and constitutionalism. Within the post-peace process era Sinn Féin have been accused of maintaining an autocratic culture and an intra-party framework that is more representative of a clandestine revolutionary organisation than a political party. Yet, simultaneously, Sinn Féin have not been immune to the pressures experienced by other modern political parties, bound by the laws of electoral competition and driven by office-seeking priorities. In order to explore Sinn Féin within the modern political arena, this article firstly examines the broader debate surrounding how armed groups make the transition into constitutional politics. Secondly, public opinion survey data is used to judge the basis of Sinn Féin's electoral appeal. Finally, internal party documents are used to examine party structure, intra-party democracy, and professionalisation in order to judge the extent to which Sinn Féin have completed the transition from being a “mouthpiece” to their armed counterpart, towards being a “normal” political party.     

Motivation and Intervention in the Northern Ireland Peace Process: An Interview with President Bill Clinton

The role of former U.S. President William Jefferson Clinton in the Northern Ireland peace process has been acknowledged as an example of political risk‐taking and leadership driven by political interests and strategic post–Cold War aims. The tendency to examine Clinton's role from the perspective of international and global policy objectives, however, has obscured consideration of his motivational role in the Northern Ireland peace process and of how he moved between encouragement and intervention to help the political parties reach a settlement. This article, which is drawn from an extended interview conducted with Clinton in 2017, seeks to paint a more comprehensive picture of Clinton's participation in the peace process, showing how his combination of motivational and interventional skills enabled him to help convince others of the need to take risks for peace and gave him greater influence and leverage over the peace process as a result.     

Dissident Irish Republican Violence: A Resurgent Threat?

This article considers the resurgence in dissident Irish republican violent activity in the years since 2007. It examines the reasons why this has occurred, citing the significance of ‘intra’ republican political developments, alongside important ‘secondary’ factors, such as the death of influential republicans Brendan Hughes and Brian Keenan. It concludes by noting that the dissident threat seems likely to exist for the foreseeable future, but also emphasises the limits of what they can expect to achieve, with there being little prospect of their emulating the Provisional IRA.     

Terrorist Skin,Peace-Party Mask: The Political Communication Strategy of Sinn Féin and the PIRA

The article analyses the political communication strategy adopted by Sinn Féin in order to legitimize the Provisional Irish Republican Army's (PIRA) terrorist campaign during their transition from violence into mainstream politics. Their endeavours to portray a triumphant republican movement in spite of the huge gap between strategic aims and achievements are examined. The political and social rehabilitation of violent Republicanism, and how their leaders have evolved from pariahs to celebrities, is also assessed. The role of the media and political elites, as well as the political discourse of the PIRA and Sinn Féin, is analysed in order to examine how the republican movement has tried to rewrite its past in an attempt to gain political and social legitimacy. Consequently, the myths reproduced by republicans to disguise their failures as historical compromises, reproducing a more benign interpretation of history which distorts the causes and consequences of terrorism, are critically assessed. The article will focus on the struggle for the legitimacy of the terrorist campaign and the propaganda system which, in the words of Garret FitzGerald (Irish Prime Minister between 1981 and 1987), has managed to turn the republican movement into the “peace party” despite murdering thousands of human beings.     

“The Movement Moves Against you”: Coercive Spoiler Management in the Northern Ireland Peace Process

More than a decade on, the Northern Ireland peace process can largely be considered a success. Despite the failure of the Provisional Republican Movement to achieve a united Ireland free of British control, the large-scale violence of “The Troubles” has been relegated to the past. Applying the logic of coercive diplomacy, this study examines the role of threats and the use of selective and limited violence by the Provisional Movement to manage real and potential opponents and challengers that have emerged within its own ideological ranks to maintain its position of dominance and prevent a spoiling of the peace process. This study shows that the Provisional Movement retained the capability to employ violence and demonstrated the credibility of coercive threat through a willingness to use force against its opponents on the Republican spectrum, and was able to do so with a high degree of impunity.