Bureaucratic Perceptions to the Politics–Bureaucracy Relations in Bangladesh: A Moral Dilemma in between Political Neutrality and Responsiveness

Irrespective of the systems of government, a major question is: what are the views and perceptions of the bureaucrats about politics–bureaucracy relations? Aiming to address this problem, in this article an attempt has been made to undertake an empirical study of bureaucracy in Bangladesh. The study reveals that as a post-colonial structure, government bureaucracy is an essential and integral part of the administration in Bangladesh but the bureaucracies are always in a dilemma regarding their relationship with the political leaderships. The relationship between politicians and bureaucrats is neither normatively dichotomous with political neutrality nor abundantly cohesive or responsive to the political leaderships according to the perceptions of bureaucracy. Moreover, bureaucracy in Bangladesh is suffering from a moral puzzle between political neutrality and political responsiveness even though the bureaucrats are still in a dominant position in some cases.     

A note on exogenous changes in incentives for and deterrence of corruption

In this note we amend the model elaborated by Acemoglu and Verdier (2000, The American Economic Review, 90(1),194–211), to examine how agents respond to an exogenous change in incentives. In particular, we apply the theoretical framework to the consequences on the corruption level in Italy of a famous sentence of the Italian Corte di Cassazione in plenary session: in this sentence, no. 500 of 1999, a revolutionary interpretation of the law has increased the area of civil liability for both the public administration and bureaucrats. This is one of the few cases in which the judge substantially legislates in a system of civil law, and the modification in incentives towards or away from corruption comes from an authority that is not part of the game.      

论中国古代民本思想与吏治的互动关系

民本思想在中国古代的政治法律实践中占有重要的地位。在以皇权政治为主导的背景下，民本的深层内涵和最终目的是要保障皇权之稳固。君与民之间的官吏阶层，是实现民本思想的具体实施者。要在制度上保障民本思想的具体落实，就要治理官吏特别是要防止官吏贪腐。因此，产生了以维护皇权为根本的民本与吏治之间的互动关系。     

农村土地流转政策的执行偏差——对小岗村的实证分析

农村土地承包经营权的流转是完善我国农村工作非常重大的现实问题,但政策执行过程中容易产生偏差。有哪些偏差,其原因何在?街道层官僚理论为分析中国农村土地承包经营权流转的政策执行提供了一个全新的理论视角。以中国改革第一村——小岗村为研究对象,以街道层官僚理论为视角,通过对小岗村的农村土地流转政策执行情况及偏差原因进行实证分析。研究发现,处于公共政策执行末梢环节的街道层官僚在资源稀缺和公共服务弹性需求的夹缝之中,因其特殊的身份、地位和工作性质而持有相当大的政策制定能力,导致公共利益权威分配过程中产生偏差;分析了形成该问题的三个具体原因,对提高我国农村土地流转政策执行的质量具有一定的借鉴意义。     

改土归流后土家族传统文化的变迁

清雍正年间,土家族地区完成改土归流后,民族融合和民族交流空前加强,在国家行政力量和民间社会力量的双重推动下,汉文化以前所未有的速度向土家族地区渗透。土家族传统文化在风俗习惯、宗教信仰、文学艺术等各个方面发生了变迁,这种变迁有着积极的影响,同时也产生了部分传统文化失传的缺憾,这是土家族传统文化面对外来文化冲击进行自身调适的结果。在文化大发展的今天,面对少数民族传统文化,既要合理开发,更要大力保护。     

绩效目标异化下街头官僚的政策执行偏差及矫正

街头官僚理论是近些年公共行政学理论的一个前沿领域.处于公共政策执行末梢环节的"街头官僚"生存于公共政策执行资源稀缺和公共服务弹性需求的夹缝之中,出现绩效目标异化,表现出典型的行动逻辑--激励不足、规则依赖、选择行为、一线弃权和理性逐利,在公共利益权威分配的过程中产生偏差.矫正街头官僚政策执行偏差的主体路径包括三个方面:政策执行机构的内部改革,政策执行直接主体的自我优化,政策执行间接主体(目标团体)的问责监督.