走向正义的分配——罗尔斯分配正义思想解读

分配正义是建设中国特色社会主义的价值追求,也是构建和谐社会的客观要求。但现实中,由于分配问题导致的贫富差距已经越来越大,可以说解决分配问题已经到了刻不容缓的地步。而罗尔斯提出的分配正义思想不仅在20世纪制度伦理中有着无与伦比的影响,而且在当代主流意识形态中代表着“平等主义”,并且从正义角度的考虑系统地论证了他的平等分配观,其与一般的妒嫉式平等的不同。罗尔斯提出的差别原则,对于我国在市场经济建设中,政府充分发挥宏观调控职能,调节收入的二次分配,缩小贫富差距,有着巨大的理论指导意义。     

程序正义理论的再梳理:从《正义论》到《政治自由主义》——遵循罗尔斯思想发展的轨迹

在1971年出版的<正义论>里,罗尔斯将程序正义分为:完善的程序正义、不完善的程序正义、纯粹的程序正义;并认为:纯粹的程序正义决定了结果的实体正义.在学术界,罗尔斯的程序正义理论产生了涟漪:赞同观点和反对主张同时存在.作为自身学术思想的发展,在1993年出版的<政治自由主义>里,罗尔斯修订了其在<正义论>里的观点,认为:程序正义的正义性,部分依赖结果的实体正义性.学术思想的修正,并不代表罗尔斯对程序正义理论的放弃,而是加强了程序正义理论的现实实践基石.     

Where the Action Is: Macro and Micro Justice in Contract Law

In contemporary private law theory the relationship between ‘macro’ theories of distributive justice and the ‘micro’ site of interpersonal transactions remains under-explored. In this paper, I draw on the ‘macro’ theory of justice articulated by John Rawls and offer an account of ‘micro contractual justice’ that helps us understand how the micro domains of contracting introduce particular relational constraints on the infusion of distributive considerations into contract law, resulting in constrained conception of ‘relational Rawlsianism’ operating in contractual domains. My framework provides a bridge between the macro and micro, helping us understand how they are in various senses separate yet interlocking, and also provides a ‘third way’ between all or nothing positions on the place of distributive justice in contract.     

假然契约与纯粹程序正义:走进罗尔斯的正义世界

罗尔斯在建构他的作为公平的正义世界的时候采取了两大策略:一是契约论,他认为他的假然契约论可以在避免古典契约论弊端的同时更好地用于解决正义问题,而且它所达到的效果是功利主义无法比拟的;二是程序正义,罗尔斯认为通过这种纯粹的程序正义就可以实现对他的正义两原则的选择,进而完成作为公平正义世界的建构.     

论罗尔斯的正义观及其借鉴意义

罗尔斯的正义观是一种普世化的正义观,主要是为了解决社会不公平问题,在保证大多数人利益的前提下,力求保证最少受惠者的最大利益。对罗尔斯的正义原则进行重新探讨和分析,从中汲取合理的因素,有助于重建社会公平。辩证地解读罗尔斯的正义观有助于我们正确把握正义的内涵从而为构建社会主义和谐社会提供有益的启迪,而且对完善社会主义市场经济和解决弱势群体问题也有一定的借鉴意义。     

正义的社会:是现实的批判还是理想的建构——从马克思和罗尔斯的自由平等的正义观谈起

马克思与罗尔斯对正义社会的要求是自由平等的,但是二人对于自由平等观的正义社会是不同的,马克思是从现实社会出发,是一种批判的正义观,而罗尔斯是根据一种社会契约来建构正义的社会,建构的是理想社会的正义观,通过对二人正义观的比较,我们能够得出对于现行社会的启示。     

Liberal equality: political not erinaceous

Ronald Dworkin’s Justice for Hedgehogs defends liberal political morality on the basis of a rich account of dignity as constitutive of living well. This article raises the Rawlsian concern that making political morality dependent on ethics threatens citizens’ political autonomy. Thereafter, it addresses whether the abandonment of (erinaceous) ethical foundations signals the demise of Dworkin’s liberalism and explores the possibility of laundering his conception so as to facilitate a marriage between the political philosophies of Rawls and Dworkin. The article finishes by rebutting some objections Dworkin raises against Rawls’s account of public reason.     

论罗尔斯对功利主义的批判

罗尔斯对功利主义的批判是为了建立一种正义理论,以期代替居于统治地位的功利主义,他对功利主义的批评,涉及到功利主义的三个错误:即功利主义没有认真考虑在一个社会里如何分配利益和福利;功利主义没有认真地考虑人与人之间的差别;功利主义没有考虑欲望满足方面的特性.而这三个错误在罗尔斯看来是目的论和道义论之间的差异、是善与正义之间的差异、是效率原则与平等原则之间的差别.在<政治自由主义>中,他又联系社会多元论的事实,对功利主义的综合性学说进行批评,使他对功利主义的批判上升到一个新的阶段.罗尔斯对功利主义的批判给我们两点启示:如何正确处理效率原则和平等原则关系问题以及如何正确处理一元与多元的关系问题.     

Transcendental institutionalism and global justice

In The Idea of Justice (2009 Sen, A. 2009. The idea of justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]), Amartya Sen distinguishes between ‘transcendental institutional’ approaches to justice and ‘realization-focused comparisons,’ rejecting the former and recommending the latter as a normative approach to global justice. I argue that Sen’s project fails for three principal reasons. First, he misdiagnoses the problem with accounts that he refers to as transcendental-institutionalist. The problem is not with these kinds of accounts per se, but with particular features of prominent approaches. Second, Sen’s realization-focus does not account well for the value of institutions of global justice. And even Sen agrees that reforms to institutions are urgently needed. And third, the distinction between transcendentalism and comparative approaches is implausible. I close by suggesting a strategy for an alternative institutionalist approach that can offer the kind of guidance for reforming the global order that Sen rightly takes as urgent.     

Reconciliation Arguments in John Rawls’s Political Philosophy

Abstract

Recently debates about the worth of “ideal theory” have directed attention to the functions that an account of a perfectly just society can serve. One function is that of “reconciliation”: learning that a seemingly undesirable feature of the social world would exist even in the perfectly just society can show us the value that it has in the present as well. John Rawls has emphasized reconciliation as among the roles of political philosophy. For instance, Rawls claims that his theory of justice can reconcile us to the pluralism of liberal democracies. In this essay, I argue that Rawls’s political theory also can reconcile the inhabitants of liberal democratic societies to the fact that such societies may be cognitively confusing on account of their complexity. Then I contend that Rawls’s work offers valuable theoretical resources for analysing a society’s transparency or lack thereof.