西方效率理论的发展与政府的微观经济角色

在新古典经济学中 ,完全竞争模型及其所确定的理想的配置效率状态 ,成为判断政府微观干预的根本标准。X效率理论和动态效率理论的发展 ,开始突破了配置效率的狭隘观念。现代奥地利学派则从市场是一个知识 (信息 )发现过程的视角 ,提出通功易事的概念 ,指出新古典意义上的经济无效率并不是政府干预的必要条件。对于政府来说 ,重要的不是去追求 (对于单个经济主体具有重要性的 )经济效率 ,而是要为经济主体追求经济效率创造良好的制度条件 ,即为通功易事提供便利。     

Contracts, Investment Incentives and Efficiency in the Restructured Electricity Market

The paper highlights and analyzes the tension between designing power sale agreements that reduce uncertainty for the private investors and running the power systems as more efficiently as possible in the restructured electricity market. The features of such agreements are preliminary in resolving this tension and, therefore, in orienting the development of electricity markets restructuring towards a competitive direction. We define a theoretical contractual model, highlighting the tension between the two opposite directions: reducing uncertainty and risk in order to attract private investment and operating the power system efficiently. We apply the theoretical model for analysing the formal structure of a selected sample of power purchase agreements, really operating in the restructured electricity markets all over the world. We show how competitive contracting can increase efficiency pressures and, at the same time, increase investment risk. We then discuss some policy implications for the design of power purchase contracts in the restructured electricity market.     

我国转轨经济中垄断性行业收入分配制度改革研究

我国改革开放以来,对电力、电信、铁路等垄断性行业进行了一定程度的改革并取得了一定成效。但是,上述行业垄断经营的基本格局并未根本改变,而垄断行业与其它行业的收入差距却在不断扩大。这类垄断性行业往往具有自然垄断的性质,即便是在引入竞争后仍有较高的垄断程度,而且上述行业普遍受到政府规制,规制政策直接影响到行业的经济效率以及收入分配问题。本文在综述国内外已有相关文献的基础上提出了将规制经济学分析框架以及"X非效率"理论引入到该问题的研究当中,构建了我国垄断性行业垄断形成的经济学模型以及"X非效率"的测量模型,提出了我国转轨经济中垄断性行业收入分配制度改革研究的整体研究思路。