Examination of Hacking and Blunt Force Skeletal Trauma

Hacking trauma is prevalent in forensic cases involving genocide and dismemberment, but research into the identification of this type of trauma is lacking. The present study examines characteristics of hacking and blunt force skeletal trauma in order to determine if there is a point at which blunt force trauma becomes distinguishable from hacking trauma. Ten implements with a range of blade angles (i.e., the striking surface of the implement) were used in conjunction with a controlled-force hacking device to impact 100 limb bones of white-tailed deer (Odocoileus virginianus). Observations of the trauma included the occurrence and degree of fragmentation, the entrance widths of the impacts, and composite scores of six hacking characteristics, especially the distinctive V-shaped kerf. ANOVA tests and regression analyses were used to assess the relationships between these characteristics and the blade angles. A significant relationship (p-value = 0.011) was found between the composite hacking scores and the blade angles, indicating that blunt force and hacking trauma can be distinguished. The entrance widths of the impacts exhibited a significant relationship with the blade angles (p-value = 0.037). There was also a significant relationship between the visibility of a V-shaped kerf in the bones (p-value = 0.003), with visibility decreasing around the 60° blade angle. These data should assist in establishing guidelines to differentiate hacking and blunt force skeletal trauma in cases where the implement is on a spectrum between sharp and blunt.     

The legal geographies of transnational cyber-prosecutions: extradition,human rights and forum shifting

This article describes legal and human rights issues in three cases of transnational online offending involving extradition requests by the United States (US). These cases were selected as all suspects claimed the negative impacts of autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) were sufficient to deny extradition on human rights grounds. We demonstrate how recent developments in UK and Irish extradition law raise human rights and prosecutorial challenges specific to online offending that are not met by established protections under domestic and internationally sanctioned approaches to extradition or human rights law. In these cases, although the allegedly unlawful conduct occurred exclusively online and concurrent jurisdiction enables prosecution at both the source and location of harm, we demonstrate why national courts hearing extradition challenges are extremely reluctant to shift the trial forum. We conclude by discussing the implications of the new geographies of online offending for future criminological research and transnational criminal justice.     

An approach to minimizing legal and reputational risk in Red Team hacking exercises

Robust cyber-resilience depends on sound technical controls and testing of those controls in combination with rigorous cyber-security policies and practices. Increasingly, corporations and other organizations are seeking to test all of these, using methods more sophisticated than mere network penetration testing or other technical audit operations. More sophisticated organizations are also conducting so-called “Red Team” exercises, in which the organization tasks a small team of highly skilled and trained individuals to try to gain unauthorized access to physical and logical company assets and information. While such operations can have real value, they must be planned and conducted with great care in order to avoid violating the law or creating undue risk and reputational harm to the organization. This article explores these sometimes tricky issues, and offers practical risk-based guidance for organizations contemplating these types of exercises.     

Passage to cyberactivism: how dynamics of activism change

The boost to activism to which the internet has largely contributed has been underlined by financial and image issues growing from hacker attacks and the online promotion of activist groups. Emergency corporate counteractions with regard to these cyber threats have not analysed this new phenomenon. The state of the research in this area has consistently remained at the period before the development and widespread use of the internet. Cyberactivism, therefore, is a cyber phenomenon without a clear meaning or a clear definition. In order to understand cyberactivism, it is important to understand that it is much more than simply about hacking and activists' online promotion. It is a new phenomenon, growing out of activism but changing the pressure on corporations. With the internet, new dynamics of issue selection have been established and a different aggregation within groups has taken place. A new organisational set‐up among activist groups puts new pressure on corporations, which must develop new strategies concerning online rules. Cyber actions are originated by individuals triggering a spontaneous relationship between many users. The pressure is no longer the result of a long aggregation into association, but of an immediate and spontaneous network of relationships. Copyright © 2003 Henry Stewart Publications     

Examining the risk reduction strategies of actors in online criminal markets

Research examining offender risk reduction strategies within illicit markets focus primarily on those operating in the real world for drugs and stolen goods. Few have considered the strategies that may be used by individuals in virtual illicit markets that are hidden from public view. This study addresses this gap through a grounded theory analysis of posts from 10 Russian and three English language web forums selling stolen data to engage in identity theft and fraud. The findings indicate that buyers employ multiple strategies to reduce their risk of loss from unreliable vendors, along with resources provided by forum administrators to manage relationships between participants. The implications of this study for law enforcement and offender decision-making research are also discussed.     

Looking for some light through the lens of “cryptowar” history: Policy options for law enforcement authorities against “going dark”

As companies and end-users increasingly deploy end-to-end encryption, law enforcement and national security agencies claim they “go dark”, i.e. lose in practice the power to legally intercept and gain access to information and communications. This has revived a debate that seemed closed by the late 1990s, namely whether backdoors should be embedded in encryption systems. This paper provides a historical overview of the policy debates surrounding encryption, to identify the potential regulatory options for policy-makers, based on the lessons that can be learned from “cryptowar” history. We discuss the First Cryptowars (1990s, focusing on backdoor schemes), the Interbellum (featuring a rise in powers to order decryption), the Second Cryptowars (2010s, renewed backdoor discussions) and their aftermath: the newly emerging battlefield of legal hacking. The latter can be seen as a condition for the truce with which – for now – the Cryptowars seem to have ended. Cryptowar history teaches us that the two main policy options for decryption by government agencies – ensuring access to keys ex ante (backdoors) or ex post (decryption orders) – both suffer from fundamental flaws. Therefore, legal hacking powers – if human rights standards are sufficiently taken into account – could be the only realistic policy option to preserve some light in an era of dark communication channels.     

Leveson Past,Present and Future: The Politics of Press Regulation

As a result of the phone‐hacking scandal and evidence of other serious journalistic abuses by some newspapers, the government set up the Leveson Inquiry to hear evidence from victims and to make recommendations for a new and effective system of press regulation. Leveson's recommendations for independent self‐regulation overseen by a “recogniser” was seen as a moderate solution which would uphold the principle of an unfettered press while providing appropriate protection from unscrupulous or unethical press behaviour. After historic cross‐party agreement, Parliament passed a resolution accepting a Royal Charter which adopted the great majority of his recommendations. In response, Britain's main national newspapers have pursued a campaign of systematic misinformation and distortion, aimed at discrediting the inquiry, its supporters and the cross‐party Charter, while promoting a different system which would remain almost wholly controlled by the industry and would in practice be little different from the discredited Press Complaints Commission. After decades of ineffectual political response to press abuse and press power, there is now a historic opportunity for Parliament to assert its sovereign power. Over the next 12–18 months, we will see whether we have reached a genuine milestone in British public life or whether the British press will remain the last bastion of unaccountable power.     

Changing the Conversation: Can the Phone Hacking Scandal Lead to a New Covenant on Media Responsibilities?

This article examines the implications of the 2011 phone hacking scandal for press freedom in the United Kingdom. Specifically, it argues that the language of rights has too long dominated public discourse, which has led to discussion of media responsibilities being evaded. The article argues that there is now an opportunity for a radical restructuring of the relationship between the press, the public, and the political system that restores the media to their rightful role as a watchdog on government and steward of the people. It points to the need for independent regulation of the press and a statutory right of reply as means through which the relationship between media and citizen can be recast on the grounds of obligation and responsibility but argues that it is only when we move away from a framework grounded in rights to one grounded in responsibilities that meaningful change can flourish.     

Identifying gaps in the research literature on illicit markets on-line

As access to technology and the Internet expanded dramatically over the last three decades, so too have opportunities for criminality. Researchers have begun to consider how the Internet enables the formation of illicit markets operating via various communications media in order to sell personal information, hacking tools, and other resources. Many of these studies provide basic information on the operations of on-line illicit markets. There is, however, a need for further research in order to improve the state of the literature and identify key questions to expand our knowledge of the practices of market actors and the social dynamics that facilitate their activities. This article introduces these concepts and outlines the state of the literature generally.     

Post‐Democracy,Press, Politics and Power

Transnational media corporations now wield enormous power and influence. Never has this been displayed so starkly and so shockingly as in the revelations that emerged during the Leveson Inquiry into the culture and ethics of the press in the UK. This paper considers the implications of the relationship between media elites and political elites for democratic culture and media reform. The paper argues that the culture of press–politician mutual interest in which media executives and party leaders collude will continue as long as the solutions proffered focus on the ethical constraints of professional journalists rather than wider structural issues relating to plurality of ownership and control and funding of news in the public interest.