The Effects of Blaming Others for Legislative Inaction on Individual and Collective Evaluations

Legislators commonly blame others for gridlock. We posit that legislators may engage in this type of rhetoric to minimize the individual reputational risks associated with legislative inaction or to boost the relative standing of their party. In a series of six survey experiments, we find that blaming others for inaction undermines voters’ evaluations of individual legislators who engage in this rhetorical strategy. This effect is particularly pronounced among out-partisans and independents. However, blaming rhetoric can also enhance the standing of the blamer’s party relative to the opposing party across all groups (including out-partisans), in large part by undermining the reputations of these other actors. Ultimately, we show that when an individual legislator engages in blaming rhetoric, the immediate net electoral effects are null. This suggests that coordinated efforts by a party to blame opponents may improve the party’s relative standing, while imposing few costs on those engaged in blaming.     

对审判级别管辖的反思——从刑事诉讼角度分析

本文简要地介绍了我国刑事审判级别管辖之有关法律规定。分析了审判级别管辖的立法意图 ,对审判级别管辖进行了法理和实践上的评析 ,认为审判级别管辖是对在法律面前人人平等的宪法原则及无罪推定原则的背离 ,其立法者主观主义明显 ,现实的级别管辖存在没有积极意义 ,为进一步完善审判体制 ,建议取消审判级别管辖 ,确立三审终审制以实现立法者对诉讼质量的重视和谨慎的意图。     

论“死法”

立法者基于政治精英的功利观念,凭借对话语权和立法权的垄断,意图将精英群体的理性和逻辑转化为社会规范.但是,由于国家理性本身的非完美性,以及国家因身兼立法、管理两职的角色冲突,加之人类本性的非理性、非逻辑因素,立法者的理想化设计往往遭到现实无情的否定,诸多逻辑化的法律成为空具形式的"死法".死法"最严重的恶果并非在于不被遵守,而在于不被信仰.法律丧失了应有的指引、评价功能,合法与非法之间的界限变得模糊,人们不再以法律为标准进行逻辑思考来预测自己的行为后果,而是诉诸与国家博弈的实践经验."死法"个别化的复活又助长了权力寻租的产生.     

Doubling Down: Inequality in Responsiveness and the Policy Preferences of Elected Officials

Is bias in responsiveness to constituents conditional on the policy preferences of elected officials? The scholarly conventional wisdom is that constituency groups who do not receive policy representation still obtain some level of responsiveness by legislators outside of the policy realm. In contrast, we present a theory of preference‐induced responsiveness bias where constituency responsiveness by legislators is associated with legislator policy preferences. Elected officials who favor laws that could disproportionately impact minority groups are also less likely to engage in nonpolicy responsiveness to minority groups. We conducted a field experiment in 28 US legislative chambers. Legislators were randomly assigned to receive messages from Latino and white constituents. If legislators supported voter identification laws, Latino constituents were less likely to receive constituency communications from their legislators. There are significant implications regarding fairness in the democratic process when elected officials fail to represent disadvantaged constituency groups in both policy and nonpolicy realms.     

试论卢梭的立法思想

法律思想在卢梭的整个思想中占有举足轻重的地位,而立法理论又是其中最为重要的组成部分。卢梭认为,法律是公意的体现,立法是为了实现正义,而立法是来自于人民的非凡人物,他们制定法律时应遵循自由与平等的原则。     

立法法理学探析

立法法理学是针对传统司法法理学而提出的研究立法的新的理论进路,法律及其与政治的关系是理解立法法理学内在逻辑的核心链条。自由是立法法理学的微观基础,政治的环境则是其宏观背景。立法法理学应当在实践哲学的框架内进行把握,即一方面要重视实践理性在立法过程中的作用,使立法者遵循立法法理学的原则、遵守立法者的义务;另一方面则要认识到德性标准在选举立法者中的重要地位,重视立法者自身德性的培养,特别是立法智慧的培养。前者是“规则主义”的立法法理学,后者则是德性主义的立法法理学,二者共同构成立法法理学的完整图貌,不可偏废其一。     

谁是“立法者”？——政治哲学和制度实践的诠释

对“立法者”的法理界定是一个看似简单实则意义深远的问题。在立法学上,它要解决的是立法权的归属问题,在司法实践中,它是探究“立法者原意”时究竟应该探寻谁的意志的深层追问。现在人们对“立法者”的概念使用莫衷一是,或指有权的立法机关,或指参与法案起草的专家,或指重要的立法辅助机构,或指实际起决策作用的立法机关首脑或组织。但实际上他们都没有揭示“立法者”的真实涵义。在民主政治社会中,从最本源和终极意义来讲．人民享有最终的立法决策权．人民是立法者：而在实行代议制的国家．人大代表（议员）才是实际的立法者。     

漫步者,抑或立法者:卢梭的身份难题及其后世影响——纪念卢梭诞辰300周年

从《社会契约论》到《孤独漫步者的遐思》,卢梭从一个力图为现代人确立政治公民共同体之正当性基础的立法者变成了一个远离公民社会的孤独漫步者,这一转变彰显了卢梭思想的两个极端,也展示了启蒙思想的内在难题,其后世的德国古典哲学家康德正是通过解决这一内在难题而确立了现代思想的基础。     

La responsabilidad patrimonial del estado legislador en el derecho español

This article analyzes the figure of the liability of the State legislature that, unlike the responsibility of the Public Administration and the Administration of Justice, under the Spanish Constitution, in the case of the legislature, its development in terms of key features and requirements, has been made by the Supreme Court, taking into account, as necessary, the European Union law. This responsibility of the State legislature may have two origins, depending essentially on the monitoring charge is used to test the law in question, the Spanish Constitution and the European Union law.     

Toe the line,break the whip: explaining floor dissent in parliamentary democracies

This article analyses the drivers of individual dissent in floor voting in parliamentary regimes. It focuses on the effect of ideological heterogeneity in legislative parties on individual MPs’ voting behaviour, as well as the different incentives caused by the differing consequences of defection and abstention. Combining individual-level survey and voting data from the Swedish Riksdag, neither of which is subject to selection bias, the study overcomes several limitations of previous research. It shows that MPs’ decisions to dissent are partly driven by ideological differences with their party, but also by the imperatives of maintaining a government majority in a parliamentary regime, along with the level of influence MPs exert on legislation. It also highlights the importance of distinguishing between abstaining from voting and defecting. Merely pooling the two oversimplifies the behaviour of MPs.