监管失灵与市场监管权的重构

从中国市场监管权的制度设计看,明显存在定位模糊、设立缺乏合理考量、配置分散、监管者非专业性等缺陷,实质上是“政企不分”、行政主导的立法模式以及权力文化等体制痼疾在监管法制架构上的一种表象。因此,必须在推进市场化进程和政治改革的过程中,通过厘清政府经济职能、明晰政府经济职权的内涵和范围、重塑监管机构、设计适当的控制机制等路径,实现市场监管权的重构。     

Discovering the Dark Side of Power: The Principal’s Moral Hazard in Political-Bureaucratic Relations

Principal agent (PA) is among the most prominent concepts for analyzing the relationship between politics and bureaucracy. Nonethelesss, the inherent bias of PA scholars to attribute moral hazard almost exclusively to the agent, usually referred to as “bureaucratic drift”, requires re-examination. Building on the spare literature in which moral hazard of the principal is considered, this paper provides empirical evidence for a neglected aspect of the PA concept. Three cases of German regulatory agencies responsible for drug control, financial services and rail safety are analyzed in critical situations which were largely perceived as bureaucratic failures. The analysis reveals that a good deal of these failures, ranging from negligence to suppressing crucial information, has to be attributed to the political principal. This is called the dark side of power because the intention is to shift blame or to dodge political responsibility. Turning conventional PA reasoning upside down, the conclusion is that the principal’s moral hazard should be considered more routinely as a potential explanation for political-bureaucratic interactions.     

The Green New Deal Must Preserve the Existing Nuclear Fleet

Abstract

As the largest source of carbon-free energy in the United States, nuclear energy must play a vital role in reducing emissions. This article suggests the Green New Deal, an ambitious federal proposal to address climate change, should aim to preserve the existing nuclear fleet by authorizing states to establish zero emission credit (“ZEC”) programs. The ZEC programs will provide credits, in the form of revenue, for the carbon-free attribute of nuclear energy. This article posits the ZEC programs should be based on a model ZEC program developed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and explicitly authorized by amendment of the Federal Power Act to avoid issues of preemption.     

行政规范性文件绩效评估的价值取向

行政规范性文件绩效评估是政府绩效评估中的重要内容,其对行政规范性文件能够起到有力的监控作用。明确行政规范性文件绩效评估的价值取向是开展评估活动的基础,既能使评估活动有一个正确方向,也能对评估活动起到指导作用。但在近年来的评估实践中,对其价值取向往往存在着许多错误的认识,如认为其仅限于促进社会经济发展、加强行政管理等方面,也有将其定位于普适性的价值,不切合行政规范性文件绩效评估的具体实践。行政规范性文件绩效评估作为一种专项评估活动,其价值取向应当体现在法治行政、人本法律观和服务行政三个方面。     

Administrative Innovations and Accountability Failures: The Termination of the Spanish Telecommunications Agency

We discuss how far accountability practices may be relevant to the success of independent regulators in countries without a tradition of administrative autonomy. We develop a conceptualisation of agency accountability failures and develop an analytical framework to examine the life and termination of the Spanish regulatory agency for telecommunications, CMT (Comisión del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones - Telecommunications Market Commission). We argue that the CMT’s termination was related, among other reasons, to accountability failures in its institutional design. The paper relies on a variety of sources, including legislation, literature, media coverage, and semistructured interviews with agency officials and several stakeholders.     

Linking democratic anchorage and regulatory authority: The case of internet regulators

Scholars and practitioners have repeatedly questioned the democraticness and the authority of transnational multi‐stakeholder organizations, especially those that regulate the internet. To contribute to this discussion, we studied the “democratic anchorages” and the regulatory authority of 23 internet regulators. In particular, we conducted a fuzzy‐set qualitative comparative analysis assessing whether and which anchorages correspond to necessary and/or sufficient conditions for exerting regulatory authority. Our results show that strong anchorage in democratic procedures is specifically relevant for this outcome. Further, we find that weak anchorage in democratically elected politicians leads to high regulatory authority, confirming the significance of non‐state actors in this policy field. More generally, our findings support but also qualify expectations about the compatibility and mutual reinforcement of democratic quality and regulatory authority at the transnational level.     

Competition and switching in public service markets: Can they reduce inequalities?

Regulatory reforms to public infrastructure services across European Union (EU) countries were aimed at increasing consumer welfare by introducing competition and choice into service markets. However, empirical evaluations have questioned whether these reforms have benefitted all consumers, suggesting that vulnerable groups of service users (especially those with lower levels of formal education), might be locked into poorly performing services. We assess the relationship between the level of competition in electricity and fixed telephony markets in EU countries and evaluate the affordability of these services for different socio‐educational layers. Our findings show that – although in countries where there is a relatively high frequency of switching, inequalities between socio‐educational groups are smaller and eventually disappear – competition as such does not play a part. These results suggest that demand‐side regulation that successfully enables consumer switching has the potential to equalize social welfare, thereby reflecting a possible convergence of regulatory instruments and the central aims of the welfare state in this context.     

The Formal Delegation of Regulatory Decisions in the Telecommunication Sector: An Explanation Using Classification Trees

Research on regulation has traditionally focused on studying the delegation of regulatory competencies from political principals to an independent regulatory agency. In this article, we argue that this delegation is nuanced by different factors that affect whether a specific regulatory decision is formally delegated. We examine and explain formal delegation patterns at the level of individual regulatory decisions in twelve countries located in Europe, Latin America, and South Asia. The data were gathered by coding the twelve countries' telecommunications legislation. The data analysis was undertaken using a classification tree model—a nonparametric model. We found that the maturity of the market has the greatest effect on the formal delegation of regulatory decisions, but this effect is also influenced by the other theoretical factors considered, particularly the level of political constraints and the type of regulation.