Enslaved by one's body? Gender,citizenship and the ‘wrong body’ narrative

This paper uses the concepts of slavery, citizenship, the body and political subjectivity to interrogate how gendered bodies are produced, regulated and normalised. It explores the ‘wrong body’ claim within transsexual narratives to analyse how we can be enslaved by/to our body. The coercive force of embodied existence is demonstrated by examining how gender norms act on us through our bodies, thus identifying the body as a major conduit of power. It argues that the ‘wrong body’ claim must be understood as a discursive construction that is rendered possible by established gender norms and practices, which place heavy restrictions on the available actions of individuals. These norms and practices are linked to the normalising processes of becoming an acceptable citizen. It is argued that the enslaving effects of embodiment can be mitigated through constructing alternative narratives of gender based upon performativity and fluidity. Such alternative gender narratives are used to contest and disrupt the meaning of the acceptable citizen, thus opening up new claims for citizenship and new forms of embodied subjectivity. These narratives are then used to critique the medical community's understanding and treatment of transsexuality, which is itself a site of coercion and normalisation.     

``That Woman Is a Woman!' the Case of Bellinger v. Bellinger and the Mysterious (Dis)appearance of Sex: Bellinger v. Bellinger [2003] 2 All E.R. 593; [2003] F.C.R. 1; [2003] 2 W.L.R. 1174; [2003] UKHL 21

In the case of Bellinger v. Bellingerthe House of Lords has for the first time exercised the power to make a declaration of incompatibility under s. 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998, finding that U.K. law on marriage is in breach of Articles 8 and 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This case note argues, however, that despite this decision, and despite also recent judgements of the European Court of Human Rights upholdingthe rights of transsexual people, the principles applied in Bellingerdemonstrate that judicial discourse on transsexuality remains bound within the heterosexual and biological framework of Corbett v. Corbett.     

Authenticity,intersubjectivity and the ethics of changing sex

This paper examines how specific concepts of the self shape discussions about the ethics of changing sex. Specifically, it argues that much of the debate surrounding sex change has assumed a model of the self as authentic and/or atomistic, as demonstrated by both contemporary medical discourses and the recent work of Rubin (2003 Rubin, H. (2003). Self-made men: Identity and embodiment amongst transsexual men. Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press. [Google Scholar]). This leads to a problematic account of important ethical issues that arise from the desire and decision to change sex. It is suggested that by shifting to a properly intersubjective and performative model of the self, we can better understand (1) the diagnosis of transsexuality; and (2) issues of success, failure and regret with regard to changing sex. The paper also reveals the important implications this shift has for how the relationship between medical practitioners and transindividuals is understood. The paper concludes by showing how the model of the self as authentic can individualise identity and thus downplay or overlook the tight intertwinement between self and other. A properly intersubjective, performative concept of the gendered self places other people at the centre of both an individual's attempt at self-transformation and the ethical issues that arise during this process.     

Girls and Boys

Law and Critique - Transsexuality recently burst once more upon the legal scene when the European Court of Human Rights found UK law denying transsexuals a new `gender re-aligned' birth...