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1.
成立抗日民族统一战线组织第二战区民族革命战争战地总动员委员会,是中共中央为推动全国抗日民族统一战线的早日建立和巩固而实施的一项重大决策,也是配合八路军挺进山西,立足华北敌后,实践党的全面抗战路线的一项重大决策。战动总会在组织形式和抗日斗争中,都充分体现了党关于建立抗日民族统一战线的科学思想,并成为当时全国统一战线的一个典范。  相似文献   
2.
Iran's influence and presence in Iraq have increased significantly in recent years. The collapse of the Saddam's dictatorship in 2003, after the US invasion, served to inflate Iran's influence in Iraq, particularly in the post-ISIS era. In this connection, Iran has used various means and tools to develop its strategy in Iraq. This article argues that Iran's current strategy in Iraq stems from a Realpolitik agenda rather than an ideological one, concerned more with political, economic, and security interests than pursuing revolutionary objectives per se. To this end, Tehran has largely relied on long-established relationships with several pro-Iranian political parties and militia groups. These relationships are often couched in religious ideological terms as a foundation and justification for its future strategy in post-ISIS Iraq. The questions that this paper will address are the following: what was Iran's role in defeating ISIS in Iraq? How has Tehran benefitted from its long-term relationships with Iraqi political parties and militia groups? What are the Iranian sources of power in Iraq and how do they help Iran gain strategic dominance in Iraq?  相似文献   
3.
The idea that populations participate politically outside of the formal mechanisms of a political system and through mass mobilizations is a reasonably accepted part of political science orthodoxy. Since the turn of the last century, in Indonesia, as in other developing countries, populations have mobilized en masse at particular stages of their histories into nation-state building processes, as well as have been mobilized by political authorities seeking to bolster or install their regimes. In the 1960s, Sukarno increasingly sought to mobilize a range of classes and interests behind his presidency and, in 1965–66, Suharto and his military backers organized anti-communist groups behind a systematic campaign to eradicate the Communist Party and remove Sukarno. Throughout the so-called ‘New Order’ period (1966–98), Suharto periodically mobilized groups behind his presidency and against opponents who, in turn, engaged in occasional street demonstrations against the regime. In the mid-to-late 1990s, the opposition leader, Megawati Sukarnoputri became an important rallying point for popular dissent against Suharto and, in 1998, the student movement played a crucial role in street demonstrations which helped bring down the president after three decades of strongman rule. In the post-Suharto period, which has seen the installation of three presidents between 1998 and 2001, mass mobilizations have continued to be a striking feature of the political landscape. President Habibie mobilized pro-government militias against opponents and student demonstrators, who threatened to bring down his regime. The Muslim supporters of Abdurrahman Wahid entered the streets in their thousands to protest the parliamentary impeachment of the president. Radical Muslim groups demonstrated against US military strikes on Afghanistan and against President Megawati Sukarnoputri's initial soft stance on the strikes. Potentially, these kinds of demonstrations could undermine Megawati's presidency. However, parliamentary processes rather than street mobilizations brought the presidencies of Habibie and Abdurrahman to an end while Megawati is still seeing out her term. This article examines the political mobilizations of the late-Suharto and post-Suharto periods and asks whether these mobilizations pose a threat to Indonesia's fragile transition to democracy and to a more stable institutional political process.  相似文献   
4.
城市拆迁引发了居民与地方政府之间的利益博弈,为了拆迁工作顺利开展,地方政府采用了间接动员的办法,通过运用行政权力驱使科层制内部的公职人员动员自己的亲属配合拆迁工作。这一动员过程是通过初始动员与次级动员两个阶段实现的,通过对私人之间强关系的反向利用,行政权力侵入私人关系网络,形成了强大的关系型动员强制机制。在公权力的作用下,私人关系网络由此被型塑成一种新的治理术。  相似文献   
5.
互联网公共事件已经成为当代中国社会的热点问题。是什么因素通过何种作用机制推动那些与特定事件没有直接利益关系的社会成员参与此类事件?本文借助“共意性社会运动”的概念,利用相似性案例比较的研究方法,分析了互联网公共事件中的社会动员机制。议题合法性、网络舆论一致性和议题传播的广泛性是互联网公共事件成功的保障。互联网发挥的议题建构、共意动员功能受制于议题的新闻和社会价值、网络关注度、媒体互动深度、网络报道空间等因素。成功的互联网公共事件必须能够在“媒体空间”内建构合法化的议题,克服互联网沟通结构的内在缺陷,才能实现共意动员,维持在线集体行动的成功。但是,研究者不应该夸大互联网公共事件的社会意义,其对社会变迁的推动作用受到网络舆论内在分裂倾向的制约,往往是特定的、暂时性的。互联网公共事件能否推动社会制度变迁取决于政府制度化该类事件的能力和意愿、互联网舆论的结构以及网络参与者的理性沟通等因素。  相似文献   
6.
基于系统动力学的动员潜力释放链运行机理研究   总被引:5,自引:1,他引:4  
在危机状态下,应急资源呈现超常规的供给能力,而超常规供给能力生成过程中的有关要素及其联系所构成的系统,被称为动员潜力释放链。本研究的目的是探索动员潜力释放链的运行机理,掌握动员潜力释放的运行规律。用系统动力学的方法对应急资源的动员潜力释放链进行了建模,并以地震中的帐篷资源为案例,对帐篷资源的动员潜力释放链进行了建模和仿真,结果表明:应急状态下超常规需求是超常规供给能力的核心导向,超常规供给能力取决于生产要素的供给能力、其他资源转变为应急资源用途的转化能力以及应急资源的现有量。  相似文献   
7.
This paper shows the pattern of diffusion of a tool of protest – blank and null voting (BNV)– in the context of Spanish national elections. It shows how the 2004 protest mobilization by Batasuna (a Basque nationalist party) predicts null voting by identifying the relationship of this form of protest with both the level of grievance of the population and the political resources of the mobilizers. The paper then demonstrates that this large and visible use of a protest tactic is followed by a heterogeneous diffusion process after the main mobilized protest event and beyond the supporters of the original mobilizer. In the 2008 national election, across Spain, citizens with grievances toward the political system and, most importantly, with political affinity with the initiators were the ones to update their individual protest repertoire with this electoral protest tool.  相似文献   
8.
自发网络政治动员给政府的控制能力带来了巨大的挑战,但网络也给政府控制自发网络政治动员带来了诸多有利因素,政府应充分利用这些有利因素加强对自发网络政治动员的控制,提高网络控制能力,促进政治和社会的稳定进步。  相似文献   
9.
Although numerous get-out-the-vote field experiments have identified the effects of particular mobilization tactics (e.g., canvassing, phone calls, direct mails) on voter turnout, we do not yet have a full understanding of the causal effect of overall mobilization. We study this by leveraging a natural experiment in Japan, in which the timing of a municipal election is as-if randomly assigned. The results show that almost concurrently held municipal elections boost these municipalities’ voter turnout in prefectural elections by one to two percentage points. We argue that some unique settings in Japan allow us not only to mitigate omitted variable bias but also to attribute the estimated effect only to mobilization, rather than the effects of cost sharing and psychological stimulus.  相似文献   
10.
吉尔吉斯斯坦自独立以来已发生了三次“革命”,广义来讲,这三次“革命”均属于“颜色革命”的范畴。但吉尔吉斯斯坦反对派在进行政治动员时,往往尚不具备其他“颜色革命”反对派发起政治动员的一系列“常见”条件(如发达的社交网络、强有力的政党、较高水平的青年组织等)。而在相关条件并不充分的情况下,反对派依托何种力量实现高效的政治动员成为一个值得研究的重要问题。为解答这一问题,吉尔吉斯斯坦反对派所掌握的三种非正式政治力量--个人政治关系网络、部族认同与部族群体、传统政治习俗成为本篇文章重点考察的因素。在三次“革命”中,这三类非正式政治力量帮助反对派实现了募集资金、召集支持者、获取舆论支持、削弱政府合法性、策反政府高层官员等一系列政治目标,成为反对派进行政治动员的主要依托。运用非正式政治力量,吉尔吉斯斯坦反对派得以在其他相关条件尚不充分的情况下,于短时间内实现有效的政治动员,并最终达到了推翻现存政权的目的。  相似文献   
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