Extravagance and mediocrity of virtue: Their divergence and the possibility of demagoguery

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle refers to Socrates five times: four references are to the contentious Socratic doctrine that “virtue is knowledge” the fifth is in the discussion of irony, “such as that of which Socrates was accused.” These issues are not conjoined accidentally. “Manifest appearances” attest that we can do worse than we know or know better than we do. Yet, the “problem of incontinence'’ is only half of the problem of the divergence of character and intellect, the mediocre and the extravagant in virtue. The other half of the problem is the capacity of some to do or act better than they know, vice's ability to imitate virtue, the disloyal talent's employment of demagoguery, the clever vice of irony.     

照料好你自己的灵魂--苏格拉底伦理思想及其现代意义

古代著作家们关于苏格拉底活动和思想的记录性材料,是最真实可靠的;对材料进行研究的最可靠方法是按照古代著作家们所理解的原则和方式来阅读和理解;神在什么意义上说苏格拉底是最聪明的人的问题,促使了苏格拉底由崇尚自然到追问人生意义的转向;在认识自己灵魂的过程中找到了一条不同于自然哲学家们探索自然整体性质的新途径;首要的道德责任是照料好自己的灵魂,使它尽可能的善;首要的智慧就是通过对话的辩证法认识善的知识;创建了以自然为基础和以理性为核心的灵魂秩序这种理性主义传统.     

孔子：中国的苏格拉底，还是塞涅卡？--拉莫特·勒瓦耶、费内隆、李明的中西哲学比较研究

在17世纪法国学者了解和研究中国哲学的过程中，有三本书值得关注：一是1642年出版的拉莫特·勒瓦耶的《论异教徒的道德》，认为孔子和苏格拉底在哲学史上的地位相同，但孔子对中国的影响比苏格拉底对西方的影响更大，由儒家领导的中国乃是柏拉图“哲学王”理想的实现；二是费内隆在1687—1689年撰写的《死者的对话》，其中有一篇题为《苏格拉底与孔子的对话》，论述了苏格拉底与孔子的思想分歧，既不同意把孔子比作中国的苏格拉底，也完全不相信孔子的“圣王”理想或柏拉图的“哲学王”理想具有哲学学理上的合理性和实现的可能性；三是1696年出版的李明（勒孔德）的《中国近事报道》，该书不再将孔子与苏格拉底对举，而是把他比作古罗马斯多葛派哲学家、一位致力于培养“哲学王”式的统治者却并不成功的“帝王师”塞涅卡，并认为在研究中国哲学时应把孔子思想与宋明理学区分开来。这三部文献在一定程度上反映了17世纪法国思想界对中国哲学认识的过程。     

Courage,regulatory responsibility,and the challenge of higher‐order reflexivity

Contemporary regulators must respond to ever‐increasing societal demands in various domains. Regulators must cope with these demands under conditions of extreme epistemic scarcity and ideological divide. This leaves regulators perplexed about what action they should take. Regulatory praxis offers two primary responses to this moral and epistemic dilemma: technical canonization and reflexive regulation. While these two approaches represent contrary regulatory philosophies, they suffer from two common blind spots: (a) disregard of the critical role of discretionary judgment in regulatory action; and (b) disregard of the dilemma of higher‐order reflexivity. The article explores the idea of higher‐order reflexivity in the regulatory context. This exploration renders visible the abysses that are faced by regulators as they attempt to resolve regulatory dilemmas through a cognizant and introspective process. The article argues that the Socratic concept of courage and the idea of forward‐looking responsibility provide a plausible framework for thinking about the challenge of regulatory judgment. It concludes with a discussion of the legal and institutional mechanisms that could both facilitate and put to scrutiny the realization of this ideal (but noting also several features of the contemporary regulatory system which constitute potential barriers).     

On Public Action

Abstract

This essay explores Hannah Arendt’s contribution to our understanding of the rhetorical as opposed to the aesthetic quality of public speech, with an emphasis upon her conception of opinion and glory. Arendt’s focus on the revelatory quality of public action in speech is widely understood to preclude or seriously limit its communicative aspect. I argue that this is a misunderstanding, and that accepting it would reduce speech not merely to the discussion of a sharply limited set of topics, but to no topics at all. Public action is speech that reveals the speaker as “answering, talking back and measuring up to whatever happened or was done.” Such revelatory speech is most appropriately judged by the standard of the glorious and the inglorious. Because such speech must inform as well as reveals, so does glorious or great speech rise to the level of greatness in part because of what is said, to whom, where, and how. Arendt’s understanding of this is shown to have significant parallels to the ordinary language philosophy of Stanley Cavell.     

哲学咨询的实质及其在中国发展的障碍

哲学咨询是咨询师用哲学理论改善来访者心境的活动。哲学咨询的主要局限体现在只用哲学理论改变来访者的认知。哲学咨询实践者声称哲学咨询是对苏格拉底传统的回归,但苏格拉底所行之事是证伪某些片面之见而非证实某种观念,他也没有像哲学咨询师那样利用智慧谋取金钱。哲学咨询只是一条从象牙塔通向菜市场的新建通道,并无丰富的实践历史经验可以借鉴。虽然当前欧美哲学咨询运动声势浩大,然而哲学咨询行业本身受到许多质疑,其在中国的发展还有不少障碍。     

善的理念与真的生活——舍斯托夫论苏格拉底

苏格拉底最大的思想贡献在于提出"善的理念",这一思想把天道和人道结合起来,一方面使人性之善上升到世界万物最高本体的地位;另一方面,又用道德本体赋予了世界万物以秩序性和目的性,从而克服了古希腊命运观的盲目性和逻各斯的外部自然性。但舍斯托夫认为苏格拉底哲学中存在着两种混淆和偷换:以人性善恶混淆和偷换自然好坏;用完善的理念混淆和偷换现实的理念。这样用抽象理念代替真实生活,使哲学成为说教。进而舍斯托夫认为,存在着苏格拉底的双重形象,即历史学家记述的苏格拉底与真实的苏格拉底。     

苏格拉底之死的哲学思考——兼论哲学的使命及生存发展

文章以古希腊苏格拉底之死为切入点,探求哲学的本质、使命以及哲学的生存发展问题.苏格拉底之死是西方哲学史上的“第一大案”.导致苏格拉底之死的原因有起诉因、政治因和哲学性格因,而苏格拉底的哲学性格,即“牛虻精神”是苏格拉底之死最真实的原因.苏格拉底用他的一生诠释了哲学的三大使命:求善、授法和批判,这三大使命是哲学的生命之本、动力之源、发展之基,也是苏格拉底以死为代价给后来、当下乃至未来的哲学指明的生存发展之路     

道德理想的生成与建构——孔子与苏格拉底道德可教思想探微

道德与生活实践相结合,是孔子和苏格拉底道德可教思想的共同旨趣。从道德认知到道德实践,孔子和苏格拉底对道德可教问题的论证思路,实际上也是道德理想国的生成与建构理路。追溯孔子和苏格拉底的道德可教思想,把握二者将道德与生活实践相结合的德育理念,对解决当前道德教育面临的困境有一定的启发和借鉴意义。