对美国国会议员选择倾向台湾立场的动机分析

运用心理学关于动机分析的理论，就美国国会议员选择倾向台湾立场的动机一题，依照内在起因、外在诱因及自我意识调节的过程展开分析。借鉴“人情与面子”模型分析美国国会议员与台湾当局的互动。分析表明美国国会议员在没有请托情况下，会根据历史经验、价值观念、角色需要及利益原则主动做出一些倾向台湾的举动。在接受请托后，国会亲台议员与台湾的关系从工具性关系向情感性关系转化。转化的程度取决于请托的力度、议员对双方关系的重新定位以及对接受请托风险的评估。台湾方面对其国际形象的整饰以及美国舆论环境也帮助议员完成心理测适。     

The Catholic Lobby: Structures,Policy Styles and Religious Networks

This article is about the place of lobbying by the Catholic Church in contemporary Australian federal politics. It builds on some previous attention by political scientists to Catholic political campaigning (eg, Hogan 1978, 1993 ; see also Byrnes 1993 ), but it is more comprehensive. Discussion of such lobbying uses various terminology and, like much lobbying, it can be viewed in a normative sense either favourably or unfavourably, as democratic or undemocratic. During the parliamentary debate in December 1996 on the anti‐euthanasia private members bill introduced by Kevin Andrews, for instance, Nick Dondas (Country Liberal, Northern Territory) alleged that ‘the debate has been driven by the Catholic community of this country’. To which his Catholic colleague Tony Abbott (Liberal, New South Wales), alleging that Dondas had blamed the bill on the ‘Catholic lobby’, responded that ‘those comments were beneath him’. ¹     

Sweetening the US Legislature: The Remarkable Success of the Sugar Lobby

The US sweetener industry comprises the production and processing of sugarcane, sugar beet and corn and, more recently, non-caloric products. The industry has always been protected by federal legislation. Such legislation has had positive and negative impacts on domestic sugar prices, which have remained relatively stable but well above the world price. José Alvarez discusses three factors behind that protective status: the industry's economic importance, the large representation of sweetener-producing states in the US Congress, and a powerful and successful lobby. Under current conditions, no change in the status quo should be expected. The major potential contingency on the horizon could be an agreement reached at the World Trade Organization eliminating existing levels of worldwide protection. Free trade negotiations have added new pressures to the US support programme. Time will tell whether or not the domestic success of the US sweetener industry can be duplicated in the international arena.     

Is the Death of Inheritance Tax Inevitable? Lessons from America

In 2001, George Bush repealed estate tax in America. This was a shock to many in the US as inherited privilege had never been popular in a country where individuals were supposed to secure the American Dream through their own efforts. The tax had existed for over a century and only 2 per cent of the richest Americans paid it. But the repeal lobby managed to build an unlikely and broad alliance against the 'Death Tax' (as they managed to rename it). The key to their campaign was a moral case against the tax, illustrated with a few well-chosen narratives. The opposition fought back, ineffectively, with pragmatic arguments and statistics. This paper will apply lessons from America to the UK politics of taxation. It will focus on the role of lobby groups and the power of moral arguments and narrative evidence over more pragmatic arguments and 'scientific' forms of evidence.     

Regulating lobbying activities in the European Union: A voluntary club perspective

This article offers a systematic exploration of why interest groups sign up to the European Union Transparency Register, a non‐binding lobby regulation system. We distinguish between instrumental and normative perspectives to explain voluntary compliance, and find that concern for one's reputation represents the most important motivational driver. Based on this, we suggest that the Transparency Register can be understood as a “voluntary club” sponsored by European institutions. This theoretical perspective captures the appeal of the instrument among lobbyists, but also a number of inconsistencies in its current design, which make it unviable in the long term. We outline implications for the ongoing reform of the Transparency Register, and more generally for the regulation of lobbying activities. The analysis draws on semi‐structured interviews with various types of lobbyists active in Brussels, and on data from public consultations organized by the European Commission.