累积投票制度探析

累积投票制度已为世界上许多公司广泛采用 ,作为一种股东行使投票权的制度 ,它在保护中、小股东利益方面起到了重要作用 ,而我国公司法中对此却无规定 ,实为缺憾。本文对累积投票制度作了浅显的探讨 ,以期对完善我国公司立法有所助益     

Hedge Funds, the Deutsche Börse Affair and Predatory Anglo-American Capitalism

Boardroom trouble at Deutsche Börse, the company that operates Germany's main stock market, has recently provoked an important debate about competing capitalist models. Werner Seifert, Deutsche Börse's ousted Chief Executive, was eager to portray himself as the innocent victim of aggressive Anglo-American investors who had bought into his company but failed to understand its traditional operating ethos. In this, he was ably supported by key figures within the ruling Social Democratic Party, who, in order to shore up the party's core support, had increasingly come to blame overseas hedge funds for the development of German corporate governance models which prioritised profits over jobs. I review the SPD's structural reading of the Deutsche Börse affair, whilst comparing it to an alternative interest-based reading. The latter allows me to focus more closely on the issue which, more than any other, led to Seifert's downfall: his refusal to bow to the expressed interests of his own shareholders by pressing ahead, against their wishes, with a hostile bid for the London Stock Exchange. Seifert's eventual removal foreclosed the possibility of an integrated London-Frankfurt stock market and, somewhat ironically given the SPD's response to the affair, as a consequence it also prevented the entry of London's highly capitalised institutional investors into the German market for corporate control. The actions of Deutsche Börse's overseas shareholders might still be seen as evidence of a predatory Anglo-American capitalism. However, their successful removal of Werner Seifert may well have been responsible for temporarily keeping other financial predators at bay.     

论股东诉权对股东权益救济的现实困境与出路

股东诉权是股东实体权益的有力保障,对于维护中小股东在公司的各项权益尤为重要。但股东通过法律赋予的诉讼权利来维护其在公司的利益明显存在很多现实困境与诸多限制条件。诉讼程序本身的复杂与大量诉讼成本的支出使股东维权困难重重。应当从公司制度本身去寻找解决之路,即立法上加强中小股东的权利配置,公司管理上实现两权分离,引进职业经理人制度,进一步加强监事会的监督作用。     

论我国股东派生诉讼制度的完善

我国公司法确立了股东派生诉讼制度。股东派生诉讼制度具有许多突破一般性公司法规范的特点。建立、健全我国股东派生诉讼制度的途径有:采取诉讼费用担保制度、限制原告股东的处分权利、明确股东败诉时的赔偿责任等。     

我国上市公司委托书征集立法研究

我国现行有关委托书征集的立法主要是委托授权的内容 ,对于征集行为还没有明确、详细的规范。随着我国上市公司股权结构的日趋多元化 ,委托书征集(包括委托书争夺 )现象将会不断发生。证券监管部门应在考察我国资本市场现状和今后发展趋势的基础上 ,借鉴其他国家相关立法 ,尽快制定有关委托书征集规则。     

独立董事法律问题研究

In order to avoid independent directors from being against minority shareholders, and urging them to play the role of checking up big shareholders and insiders with full power in listed companies, the rules for independent directors shall be amended gradually. Currently, the reform on the independent director regime shall be made in some aspects. First, the positions of independent directors shall be held by qualified professionals; Second, independent directors shall pass the exam for such posts; Third, independent directors shall take full-time jobs; Fourth, the firms of independent directors shall be established with limited partnership liability; Fifth, independent directors shall undertake joint liabilities. Guan Xiaofeng, professor of School of Civil and Commercial and Economic Laws, China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL). He is also an arbitrator of China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Committee (CIETAC). He has engaged in teaching and research on civil and commercial laws for a long term, and written a monograph of Introduction to Financial Law. Moreover, he has released over 40 academic papers in respect of commercial, financial and contract law.     

公司分立中小股东保护的若干法律问题研究

公司会因各种原因引起分立 ,公司分立中小股东尤其应当给予保护 ,小股东应享有异议估价权、股份收买请求权、不作为及损害赔偿等请求权。我国在未来公司立法中应引入累积投票权、股东派生诉讼及股东投票权排除等制度以保护小股东的权益。     

股东直索责任的传承与创新

对于股东直索责任制度不同称谓的语意进行考察不仅是出于法学理论的严密性的要求，更是因为不同的名称显示出了不同国家对于该法律制度本质的认识。德国公司法上的“直索责任”用语是科学的制度称谓。法人人格与腮东有限责任是不同的两项制度，公司人格之获得与股东有限责任之取得在逻辑上存在着明显的理论分野，所谓的“法人人格否认”，实质上指的是股东有限责任无效之宣示。逆向揭开公司面纱并没有其法理基础，难以构成与股东直索责任相应的公司法律上的新型制度形式。我国刑法中规定的单位犯罪包括单罚制和双罚制，需要依照直索责任原理做出相应的修正，单罚制实质上适用的即是股东直索责任的原理．而双罚制则是传统法人犯罪的观点。     

《公司法》有关公司对外担保新规定的质疑

新修改的《公司法》有关公司对外担保问题的规定,对于规范公司担保秩序有一定的积极意义,但是这些规定也有明显的局限性,主要表现在:规则的自律性和强制性交融,担保的合法有效性未得到明确;法条过于简洁,牺牲了规则的精确性,导致规则的不确定性;过度追求交易安全,片面要求股东大会对担保事项决议,损害交易效率;未给特殊的公司类型留下特别的空间,妨碍公司日常业务的合法开展;法律本身的缺憾加上有关监管规章的未紧密配套,使得有关缺憾更加明显。     

有限公司股东出资争议救济分析

有限责任公司凭股东之间的互相信任达到资产集合的目的，这就是公司是财产集合体中的人合性因素，股东的信赖利益又源于各个股东都出了资，股东的投资利益和投资风险都与公司绑在了一块，当部分股东没有出资、出资不实、出资不到位、抽回出资时，他对公司的承担责任的就相应减少、但他在公司获得的利益却保持不变甚至相应增加，其他股东感觉不公平，于是就造成了许多因出资引发的争议。没有出资股东对已经出资股东的五种不公平情形，其中最重要不是分红，而是获取公司高管的机会，对此的争议救济方法主要包括：各股东按照公司章程或者出资协议的规定行使股权，不能达成协议的，各股东仍然应按照原来股权范围行使股权，要求未出资和未完全出资的股东限期出资，未出资的股东暂停其表决权、知情权、参与公司管理权和暂停担任公司高管职务，要求减少未完全出资的股东的表决权，减少后的比例与其已出资占应出资的比例相当，要求暂停未完全出资股东担任公司高管职务，减少未完全出资股东担任公司高管职务的数量，减少的数量与其已出资比例相当，除了公司高管之外，该股东推荐（或者委派）担任公司高层管理人员的数量也应相应减少。