Recent developments in German corporate governance

This paper provides an overview of the German corporate governance system. We review the governance role of large shareholders, creditors, the product market and the supervisory board. We also discuss the importance of mergers and acquisitions, the market in block trades, and the lack of a hostile takeover market. Given that Germany is often referred to as a bank-based economy, we pay particular attention to the role of the universal banks (Hausbanken). We show that the German system is characterised by a market for partial corporate control, large shareholders and bank/creditor monitoring, a two-tier (management and supervisory) board with co-determination between shareholders and employees on the supervisory board, a disciplinary product–market, and corporate governance regulation largely based on EU directives but with deep roots in the German codes and legal doctrine. Another important feature of the German system is its corporate governance efficiency criterion which is focused on the maximisation of stakeholder value rather than shareholder value. However, the German corporate governance system has experienced many important changes over the last decade. First, the relationship between ownership or control concentration and profitability has changed over time. Second, the pay-for-performance relation is influenced by large shareholder control: in firms with controlling blockholders and when a universal bank is simultaneously an equity- and debtholder, the pay-for-performance relation is lower than in widely held firms or blockholder-controlled firms. Third, since 1995 several major regulatory initiatives (including voluntary codes) have increased transparency and accountability.     

Shareholder value in an adverse environment: the German case

The German political economy has often been cited as a classical case of non-shareholder value orientation. Its productionist, long-term, consensus orientation has often been contrasted with the 'Anglo-Saxon approach'. The influence of shareholders who press for shareholder value and the importance of the equity market have traditionally been low. But there are signs of change. In this article we describe some of these changes and try to assess the dynamics of this change process. First we show that the limited role of the equity market for company financing and for private household savings still provides a very narrow base for a shareholder value economy in Germany. The central pillars of the German system of corporate governance - the dominating role of banks, the system of co-determination and the company centred management system - are not crumbling. Change in the direction of shareholder value is therefore limited.     

工资集体协商实践与立法关联度的实证考察

工资集体协商立法以"协约自治"制衡理论为依据,通过劳资双方权利设计、政府部门权力限制、民主管理制度等配套制度的支持,实现劳资双方自主沟通并确定劳动条件。相关案例说明,工资集体协商实践存在四种类型,都可以用"统合协作"理论进行统领:在集体劳动关系的建立过程中,政府参与是主要条件,劳资协作是发展趋势和追求目标。"统合协作"实践是实现"协约自治"立法的合理路径,因为从全球发展趋势来看,"协约自治"需要政府的介入;从2014年以后的实践来看,"统合协作"的实践状态正在向"协约自治"的立法要求逐步转变。