Implicit Attitudes,Explicit Choices: When Subliminal Priming Predicts Candidate Preference

Citizens are asked to make many judgments in politics, often in the face of scarce information and limited motivation. In making political judgments, citizens may rely upon a variety of cues, including the partisanship, ethnicity, race, or sex of candidates. Some cues, however, are more democratically troublesome than others. Democratic norms of equality suggest that attitudes towards racial or ethnic groups should not influence citizens’ evaluations of candidates. Often, however, attitudes towards these groups do matter. This article identifies a limiting condition on the effect of group attitudes: the presence of a party cue. I demonstrate that attitudes towards Hispanics influence willingness to support a Hispanic candidate, but only in the absence of a party cue. The article also contributes to existing work by analyzing both explicit and implicit measures of attitudes towards groups. Explicit measures include stereotypes and feeling thermometers; implicit measures are derived from a subliminal priming task. Subjects with positive attitudes towards Hispanics (whether these attitudes were measured implicitly or explicitly) were more likely to support the Hispanic candidate, in the absence of party cues. Subjects with negative attitudes towards Hispanics were less likely to support the Hispanic candidate, in the absence of party cues. The presence of party cues, however, eliminates the impact of attitudes towards Hispanics on political choice.

Is anyone listening? Mass and elite opinion cueing in the EU

The paper analyses the connections between elite and mass opinion in the European Union. It considers both the ways in which mass publics use heuristics supplied by political elites to form their EU opinions, and the ways in which political elites respond to the opinions of the mass publics they represent. The paper employs data from simultaneously-conducted elite and mass surveys carried out in sixteen European countries in 2007. The results show that masses and elites in Europe do appear to take cues from one another in forming their EU opinions. Political elites base their individual-level opinions on the average position taken by their respective (national) party supporters. Mass respondents base their opinions on the average position taken by elite members of the (national) party with which they identify.     

Leader heuristics,political knowledge and voting in Britain's AV referendum

This paper uses data gathered in the British Election Study's 2011 AV Referendum Survey to investigate the impact of party leader images on referendum voting. The emphasis on leader images accords well with research showing that leader heuristics have sizable effects on voting in major referendums and general elections in Britain and other mature democracies. Reacting to these findings, some analysts have argued that the effects of leader images are heterogeneous, being stronger for voters with lower levels of political knowledge. In contrast, consistent with recent research in experimental economics and political psychology, it can be hypothesized that more knowledgeable voters rely more heavily on leader heuristics than do less knowledgeable individuals. Using multivariate statistical techniques developed for interpreting interaction effects in nonlinear models, analyses indicate that a political knowledge index focusing on the electoral system does not have statistically significant effects on referendum voting. However, voters' knowledge of leaders' positions on AV does interact with leader images. The analyses show that voters with higher levels of political knowledge are influenced more strongly by leader heuristics than are those who are less knowledgeable.     

食品安全风险的社会放大及其法制因应之道

1988年,Kasperson及其合作者创立的"风险的社会放大框架"以风险的社会属性为基础,揭示了风险在传播过程中的放大过程。通过分析"三鹿奶粉事件",可以发现该分析框架对食品安全风险放大具有解释力。为应对食品安全风险的社会放大,不能止于食品安全风险交流制度,而应当构建以多重食品安全风险为对象的风险评估法律制度,构建灵活多元的食品安全风险管理法律制度,探索食品安全风险社会放大的法制因应之道。     

The problem with ‘dots’: questioning the role of rationality in the online environment

Regulatory theorists often use the ‘dot’ as a metaphor to help conceptualise their models of a given environment. Lessig famously used the ‘pathetic dot’ in his classic, ‘Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace’ and Murray’s ‘Regulation of Cyberspace’ used interconnected dots to help describe networked communitarianism and to discuss the effectiveness and implementation of symbiotic regulation. However in both models, the dot is seen as a rational actor. The rational ‘dot’ is presumed to have a complete set of preferences and the ability to gather all the necessary information in order to make an informed decision that optimally reflects their choices and preferences. However, research from psychology and, increasingly, economics has shown that humans are often prone to making errors in judgements. The paper argues that using the metaphor of dots to describe how rational actors behave in the digital environment is problematic. Actors deploy heuristics when making judgements, resulting in systematic errors and biases, often compromising the assumptions of the regulator. Accordingly, the way actors behave in the online environment is not rational at all; thus, models built on rationality start from a false premise.     

Feelings about party leaders as a voter's heuristic – what happens when the leaders change? A note

Recent analyses of voting at British general elections deploy a valence theory according to which electors evaluate each party's performance and policies and vote accordingly. Many voters, however, avoid at least some of the effort involved in assembling and assessing information about parties' policies and instead use heuristics such as their feelings about the party leaders as major determinants of their decisions. When party leaders are changed, therefore, differences in voters' feelings about predecessor and successor could lead to changes in party choice. That argument is tested for the 2015 and 2017 British general elections in England, between which all three largest parties changed their leader, with results entirely consistent with the argument. In addition, there were significant changes in feelings about the new party leaders during the six weeks of the 2017 campaign, and these too were linked to final voting choices in the expected directions.     

Party brands and voting

Some scholars argue that Western societies have seen a decreasing impact of voting behavior based on cleavages and party identifications. Equally, issue ownership voting is seemingly not increasing its relevance by filling this gap. From this departure we seek out an alternative variable by posing the question: Do party brands influence voting behavior? Currently, we do not know because the two research fields of voting behavior and party brands are currently not explicitly linked. Traditionally, the study of voting behavior has gained powerful insights from concepts such as cleavage structure, party identification and issue ownership. On the other hand, the study of political brands has illuminated how people employ brands in their identity construction and how voters use party brands to differentiate between political parties. In this light, the article first distinguishes the brand concept from related heuristics and voting models. Next, the article measures the brand value of Danish parties by utilizing a representative association analysis. Finally, this measure is used to conduct the very first empirical analysis of a party brand's effect on voting behavior. Overall, the primary finding demonstrates that political brand value (PBV) has an effect on voting behavior—also when a number of other relevant explanatory variables are held constant.     

The Messenger Overwhelming the Message: Ideological Cues and Perceptions of Bias in Television News

Survey research has demonstrated that citizens perceive ideological bias in television news, specifically with regard to CNN and Fox News Channel (FNC), which allegedly represent the liberal and conservative viewpoint, respectively. In this paper I argue that attaching the CNN and FNC labels to news stories sends an ideological cue to the viewer regarding the content of the story. Utilizing an experimental design that allows manipulation of the network attribution of actual FNC and CNN content, I am able to demonstrate that the CNN and FNC labels function as ideological signals to the viewer, with this signal being most pronounced among ideologues whose views are supposedly at odds with those attributed to the network.

Left–right ideology as an inferential device in multiparty systems: Can citizens overcome low information by imputing parties' policy positions?

This study examines the extent to which knowledge about parties' ideological Left–Right positions can be used schematically by voters to impute these parties' stances on specific policy issues. Can Left–Right familiarity help citizens, whose knowledge of political and societal issues is often limited, to overcome the low information problem? Based on two Swedish panel studies, we show that - in contrast to the American two-party context – the least knowledgeable voters benefit most from using inferences based on parties' Left–Right locations. The effectiveness of schema-based deduction is thus dependent on its place within a given political culture. In the Swedish multiparty context, the Left–Right dimension is meaningful for most voters, and can be used schematically to partly alleviate a lack of knowledge.     

Made in the USA? Immigrants' imported ideology and political engagement

This study explores both the extent to which immigrants' pre-migration ideological predispositions might serve as a heuristic, by which these individuals anchor and adjust their ideological predispositions in the new polity, and the extent to which imported ideology enhances the likelihood of immigrants' political engagement once in their new home. Empirical tests take advantage of two unique survey datasets of Mexican immigrants residing in the United States; one of which incorporates a survey embedded experiment. Results show that immigrants' ideological predispositions in the country of origin do anchor these individuals' ideological predispositions in the new host country in terms of intensity and directionality. Most importantly, imported ideology does heighten the prospects of immigrants' electoral participation in the United States.