现实选择与理性诉求:地方政府自身利益的实践逻辑

在现实生活中,地方政府自身利益是客观存在的。地方政府通过追求任期内政绩工程来实现官员的个人利益,通过机构扩张和预算最大化来实现机构利益,通过获取辖区财政资源来实现辖区共容利益。这种利益的实现是地方政府基于外在监督和内在收益而做出的现实选择。在外在监督缺失的情况下,地方政府对自身利益的追求导致政府行为的异化和扭曲,需要采取有效措施予以治理。     

对有限责任公司股权转让新方式的探索

在目前的法律框架下,有限责任公司的股权转让方式仅限于自益权和共益权同时让渡。随着市场经济的进一步发展,这种股权转让方式的弊端日益显现。基于自益权和共益权的不同性质,在股权转让时,应把这两种权利分离,分别进行转让。对于可能因此而引起的权利冲突,可通过规范股权转让行为等方式予以解决。     

Social spending,partisan bias and vote choice. Evidence from the US

Most models in political science and political economy assume that benefiting from public spending increases the likelihood of voting for the government. However, we do not have much empirical evidence on the conditions under which recipients of public spending reward governments for their public transfers. This article studies the electoral implications of welfare spending cuts in the early years of the Reagan Presidency, when public spending changes were particularly pronounced. Using 1982 NES data, this paper demonstrates that voters who lost public benefits punished Reagan but this only occurred when they identified with the Democratic Party. By contrast, benefit recipients not affected by government cuts were more likely to support Reagan, but again this was only significant among voters identifying with the party of government. This paper thus finds that governments cannot automatically “buy” votes by using welfare spending, the influence of which is instead cushioned by party identification.