Split-ticket voting in German Federal elections, 1953–90: an example of sophisticated balloting?

Though the German electoral system has provided the opportunity of split-ticket voting since 1953, until now there has only been mere speculation concerning the rationality of ticket-splitting. In this paper we examine the rationality thesis empirically, using data provided by the official representative electoral statistics of the Federal Republic. Modifying the Downsian notion of rational voting, rational ticket-splitting is defined in terms of coalition building and of voters' expectations of the electoral success of candidates and parties. Applying this conceptual framework, it will be shown that the combinations of first and second votes actually chosen by a majority of the German electorate can rather be conceived of as a product of accident than of tactical considerations.     

Linking coalition attitudes and split-ticket voting: The Scottish Parliament elections of 2007

The Scottish Parliament elections of 2007 were the third to be held under the country’s mixed-member proportional system. As voters continue to adapt to the new system, we explore two aspects of its use: i) preferences for coalitions as opposed to single-party government, and ii) ticket-splitting. The two are considered together for two reasons. First, both can be seen as manifestations of a preference for multiple parties, and as a result they share a number of likely predictors in common. In empirical practice, however, we find that rather different factors predict the two variables: ticket-splitting looks to be based on strategic partisan or ideological calculation, whereas coalition attitudes are less about partisan interests and more about an overall view of the kind of policies and politics delivered by coalitions. Second, there is potential for a causal connection between our two dependent variables, and indeed we do find clear evidence of such an attitude–behaviour link: some voters appear to split their ticket precisely because they would prefer a coalition.     

Does ticket-splitting decrease the accuracy of recalled previous voting? Evidence from three German panel surveys

This paper addresses the role of ticket-splitting in decreasing the accuracy of recalled previous voting. It suggests that ticket-splitting makes recalling vote choice a more difficult task and thus increases recall error. Using data from three German panel surveys conducted from 1998 to 2008, the paper demonstrates that ticket-splitting increases recall error by a considerable margin, even after controlling for behavioral and attitudinal predictors. This finding suggests that recall accuracy is not a stable voter characteristic. It also lends credence to the notion that the increase in ticket-splitting in recent German elections decreased the accuracy of recalled previous voting. Finally, the evidence suggests that electoral systems affect the validity of survey answers concerning previous vote choice.