Mobilizing different types of voters: The influence of campaign intensity on turnout in direct democratic votes

A well-established body of literature links voter turnout to political campaigns. In this view, intensive campaigns increase the perceived salience of a decision, fostering information-seeking and, ultimately, turnout. The existing literature has also advanced our understanding of how direct democratic institutions influence turnout in elections. Yet we still know little about whether and to what extent campaign efforts influence voter turnout in direct democratic votes, and we know even less about who is mobilized. We claim that campaign intensity has differentiated effects across voters, depending on voters’ participation profile. To test this claim we use a rich dataset of official turnout data covering more than 40 direct democratic votes in Switzerland. The results support our claim. While intensive political campaigns overall foster citizens to turn out to vote, they do so especially for “selective” (or “intermittent”) voters, who need to decide anew at each ballot whether to turn out or not. Interestingly, we also find that frequent abstainers are not immune from campaign effects, and get almost as strongly mobilized as selective voters in highly intensive campaigns.     

Was treibt die Stimmbürger an die Urne? Eine empirische Untersuchung der Abstimmungsbeteiligung in der Schweiz, 1981‐1999

Zunächst werden die theoretischen Überlegungen kurz dargelegt, die zur Entscheidungs‐ bzw. zur Mobilisierungshypothese führen. Zudem wird die Theorie des ‘expressiven Wählens’ vorgestellt, und es wird auf zwei weitere Hypothesen über Bestimmungsgründe der Stimmbeteiligung eingegangen. Danach wird der Schätzansatz beschrieben, bevor wir uns mit den empirischen Ergebnissen beschäftigen. Sie sprechen nicht nur sehr stark für die Mobilisierungs‐ und gegen die Entscheidungshypothese, sondern zumindest bei den fakultativen Referenden spielen auch die erwarteten (bzw. befürchteten) finanziellen Auswirkungen eine entscheidende Rolle. Allerdings sind sie nur bedingt mit der Theorie des expressiven Wählens vereinbar.     

The dark side of disagreement? Revisiting the effect of disagreement on political participation

Thriving democracy requires an open exchange of disagreeing viewpoints. Yet disagreement may have a dark side. Recent research claims that people who experience disagreement in their informal political discussions are less likely to vote. This paper adds to a growing group of challenges to the notion of a ‘dark side’. It addresses the conventional wisdom from both a theoretical and practical viewpoint. I argue that disagreement in itself should not depress participation. Only those atypical respondents who encounter entirely disagreeing viewpoints are less likely to vote than those who encounter completely agreeing perspectives. People with mixed networks are equally likely to vote as those who face complete agreement. This paper tests the alternative theory against the conventional wisdom by returning to the dataset that first found evidence of the ‘dark side’. The evidence overwhelmingly supports the alternative theory. As a result, this study helps to mitigate concerns about the negative effects of disagreement and supports a network-centric approach to political science.     

Using prediction market data for measuring the expected closeness in electoral research

This article analyzes the effect of the expected closeness on turnout for 56 direct-democratic votes held in Switzerland between 2012 and 2015. It is the first study to measure the expected closeness by using data obtained from prediction markets. It clarifies empirically the relation between the expected closeness and the levels of turnout in direct democratic votes showing that the expected closeness of the result exerts a positive effect on participation levels.     

High turnout in the Low Countries: Partisan effects of the abolition of compulsory voting in the Netherlands

We use a quasi-experimental framework to test the conventional wisdom that left-of-center parties benefit from higher turnout by analyzing the partisan effects of the abolition of compulsory voting in the Netherlands. Fixed effects, multilevel, and matching models of party family vote shares in the Netherlands before and after the reform–and in reference to a control group of Belgian party families–show consistent evidence the voting reform led to an increase in the vote share of Dutch social democratic parties and a decrease in the vote share won by minor and extreme parties. We find some evidence that Christian democratic and liberal parties also benefited from the voting reform, but argue this finding is not causally related to the reform itself.     

Constraints on the turnout gap between high and low knowledge (or income) voters: Combining the Duncan-Davis method of bounds with the Taagepera method of bounds

Countries differ quite substantially in mean turnout levels, and it is equally well known that there may be substantial within-country variation as well, for example, between high income and low-income groupings or between high political knowledge and low political knowledge groupings. It has been hypothesized that the size of such between-group gaps will fall as turnout rises, and conversely (Franklin, 2004. Blais, 2000). However, as Franklin (2004) also noted, there are mathematical constraints on the size of the turnout gap that are related to the level of turnout. For example, in the limit, if turnout is 100%, then all groups must have identical turnout. Here we build on this insight by adapting the classic work on boundary conditions done by two sociologists (Duncan and Davis, 1953) to show precisely what the boundary constraints look like over the entire range of turnout values. Then we show how these constraints can help make sense of the strong relationship found between overall turnout and the size of the gap between voters above and below the median in political knowledge in the Fisher et al. (2008) cross-national study. To do so we draw on ideas in Rein (Taagepera, 2007) and (Taagepera, 2008) about how to use boundary condition information to develop better theoretical models.     

Economic globalization and voter turnout in established democracies

This paper asks whether international economic integration negatively affects electoral turnout. The theoretical model builds on the premise that economic integration constrains the ability of national governments to shape outcomes. Citizens are conscious of such constraints and take them into account when considering the costs and benefits of casting a vote in national elections. The result is a lower inclination to vote under conditions of high economic integration. Consequently, aggregate turnout is lower the more internationally integrated a national economy is. Analysis of aggregate data for parliamentary elections in 23 OECD democracies over the period 1965–2006 robustly supports this hypothesis. The empirical estimates suggest economic globalization as a central cause of the general decline in turnout within established democracies.     

Compulsory voting,turnout, and support for left-wing parties: The case of Australia

Does compulsory voting and the higher voter turnout that it produces increase support for left-wing parties? An influential and highly cited study provides strong evidence for such an effect in Australia. However, several quasi-experimental studies find little support for it in Europe. Given these conflicting findings, this study reanalyzes the crucial Australian case. It uses a unique, more fine-grained district-level dataset (N=4,219) and difference-in-differences designs to more directly test the assumed causal mechanism between compulsory voting and left-wing party support. Overall, it finds little evidence for the commonly assumed positive direct effect of turnout on Labor’s vote share. Further analyses identify an indirect effect of turnout – Labor’s decision to run candidates in more districts under compulsory voting – as an alternative mechanism and electoral system change and the Great Depression as potential confounding factors. These findings have important implications for our understanding of the political consequences of compulsory voting.     

A behavioral measure of the enthusiasm gap in American elections

What are the effects of a mobilized party base on elections? I present a new behavioral measure of the enthusiasm gap in a set of American elections to identify how the turnout rate of the party faithful varies across different contexts. I find that the advantaged party can see its registrants turn out by four percentage points more than the disadvantaged party in some elections, and that this effect can be even larger in competitive House districts. I estimate the net benefit to party vote share of the mobilized base, which is around one percentage point statewide, and up to one and one half points in competitive House contests. These results suggest that the partisan characteristics of an election have consequences not just for vote choice, but for the composition of the electorate.     

Coattails and spillover-effects: Quasi-experimental evidence from concurrent executive and legislative elections

Concurrent elections are widely used to increase turnout. We theorize and show empirically how concurrency affects electoral outcomes. First, concurrency increases turnout and thereby the participation of peripheral voters. Second, in combined elections, one electoral arena affects the other. In our case of majoritarian executive elections concurrent to proportional representation (PR) legislative elections, the centripetal tendency of majoritarian elections colors off to the concurrent PR race. Third, concurrency also entails spillovers of the incumbency advantage of executive officeholders to the concurrent legislative race. Drawing on quasi-random variation in local election timing in Germany, we show that concurrency increases turnout as well as council votes for the incumbent mayor's party and centrist parties more generally, with slightly more pronounced gains for the political left. As a consequence, concurrent elections consolidate party systems and political power by leading to less fragmented municipal councils and more unified local governments.