Arab Muslim Attitudes Toward the West: Cultural,Social, and Political Explanations

We utilize pooled data from Zogby International's 2002 Zogby, James. 2002. What Arabs Think: Values Beliefs and Concerns, Utica NY: Zogby International.  [Google Scholar] Arab Values Survey (carried out in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and UAE) in order to test for “cultural,” “social” and/or international “political” influences on Arab Muslim attitudes toward “Western” countries (Canada, France, Germany, UK, and USA). We find little support for “cultural” hypotheses to the effect that hostility to the West is a mark-up on Muslim and/or Arab identity. We find only limited support for “social” hypotheses that suggest that hostility to the West is predicted by socioeconomic deprivation, youth, and/or being male. We find the strongest support for a lone “political” hypothesis: hostility toward specific Western countries is predicted by those countries' recent and visible international political actions in regard to salient international issues (e.g., Western foreign policies toward Palestine).     

So what's new? Rethinking the ‘new antisemitism’ in a global age

ABSTRACT

Judaken discusses the various strands that constitute the so-called ‘new antisemitism’. He argues that this is not the first time a new crisis of antisemitism has been heralded. Indeed, in the wake of every major struggle in the Arab-Israeli conflict since the Six Day War, prominent scholars and advocates have sounded the alarm about a crisis resulting from the rise of what they designated a ‘new antisemitism’. Moreover, what writers point to as the vectors of the new antisemitism—Holocaust denial, the antisemitism of the extreme left, antisemitism in the Islamic world, anti-Zionism as antisemitism, even anti-racism as antisemitism—all have a fairly long history. What has changed are the role of information technologies and the geo-global context in which they function. These technologies have both facilitated the global dissemination of antisemitism as well as furnishing new means of combatting it. At bottom, this electronic warfare is both a symptom and a cause of the global forces at work in antisemitism today. After delineating the constellation of factors in the rise of global antisemitism post-September 2000, Judaken then draws on the work of Léon Poliakov, Judith Butler, Jean-Paul Sartre and the Frankfurt School, among others, to assess what Pierre-André Taguieff most aptly calls the ‘new Judaeophobia’.     

The groupuscularization of neo-Nazism in Germany: the case of the Aktionsbüro Norddeutschland

Since the beginning of the 1990s, in the aftermath of a series of brutal attacks on foreigners and asylum-seekers, seventeen neo-Nazi organizations have been banned in Germany. In addition, public events such as the yearly marches in honour of Rudolf Hess have been prohibited. It is for this reason that some members of the neo-Nazi movement have turned to the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National Democratic Party of Germany), which, under a new leadership, has opened its ranks to neo-Nazi skinheads. Another part of the violent far right has developed new organizational modes of operation, without central, rigid or formal structures. Small, locally based groups—the so-called freie Kameradschaften (free fellowships) have been set up and are operating mainly at a local or regional level. Co-operation between them is ­guaranteed by regular meetings and by longstanding contacts between their leaders. If the freie Kameradschaften are analysed as a social movement, one can identify numerous groupuscules within the German neo-Nazi scene that contribute, each in its own specific way, to its continuity, development and diversification. One of the more relevant of these groupuscules is the Aktionsbüro Norddeutschland (Northern Germany Action Bureau), whose ideology is openly neo-Nazi. Its main field of activity is its Internet website, from which it appeals to its supporters to take part in neo-Nazi demonstrations and virtually organized campaigns.     

Reviews

The recent discourse on ‘new antisemitism’ and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict sometime gives the impression that Europe is fundamentally and irredeemably antisemitic. Klug maintains that, while there is a persistent vein of antisemitism in the culture, and while there is evidence of an increase in anti-Jewish attacks since 2000, this perception of Europe is exaggerated. He argues that it is part of a mindset that tends to overstate hostility towards Israel and Jews, or to assume that this hostility is antisemitic, or both. Often this goes along with a tendency to connect antisemitism, via anti-Zionism, with anti-Americanism. Klug believes that notion of a mindset, Klug turns to the question of definition, examining the view that antisemitism is indefinitely mutable. Invoking recent work on the subject, he suggests that at the core of antisemitism is the stock figure of the ‘Jew’. This gives us a criterion with which to judge whether or not a given text—including an attack on Israel or Zionism—is antisemitic. On the basis of the analysis so far, Klug critiques the view that hostility to Israel in general is a new twist on an old antisemitic theme. In this connection, he discussed a 2003 Eurobarometer opinion poll in which 59 per cent of respondents said that Israel is a ‘threat to peace in the world’. Some see this as proof that Europe is antisemitic; Klug rejects this interpretation and traces it back to the mindset he has describing. He argues that people in the grip of this mindset tend to take a one-sided view of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This can lead to ‘antisemitism in reverse’: projecting the figure of the antisemite on to someone who does not fit the bill. Klug concludes that the prospects for the European debate on antisemitism are poor unless it can be disentangled from partisan Middle East politics.     

Anti-Americanism in Electoral Politics: Insights from South Korea's 2002 Presidential Election

Since September 11, 2001, anti-Americanism has emerged as an important issue in international politics. In democratic election campaigns, anti-Americanism should be an attractive issue where it is expected to have a favorable impact on key swing vote constituencies. Anti-Americanism has certain inherent ideological appeals and more varied historically-based attractions. Anti-Americanism should be least attractive where countries continue to rely on U.S. security guarantees. South Korea's December 2002 presidential election, in which winner Roh Moo-hyun openly sympathized with anti-American demonstrators, appears to contradict this expectation. Yet closer analysis of individual-level polling data shows that anti-Americanism was, both statistically and substantively, much less significant than alternative campaign issues. By activating the numerous voters hostile to the North Korean regime, anti-Americanism actually hurt the victor's electoral chances. The approach appears useful in understanding why anti-Americanism is a more prominent ideology and electoral issue in some regions, such as Western Europe and Latin America, and a less prominent one in others, for example Eastern Europe, East Asia, and Oceania.     

Explaining Interstate Trust/Distrust in Triadic Relations

Emotion or affect is important to understanding the current international interactions. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationships among interstate affects in triads. The hypotheses of structural balance, symmetry, subjectivity and objectivity are tested here. Nations are more likely to trust a target nation when the target trusts them, when their friend trusts the target, when they trust other nations in general, and when other nations in general trust the target. Their attitudes towards the target are not influenced by the fact that their enemy trusts or distrusts the target. The structural balance gives way to some dyads of imbalance. Rather, nations are unlikely to feel friendly towards an enemy of their enemy's. More than 80% of bilateral affects are correctly predicted with the other affect relations only. Some implications on the spread of anti-Americanism and on the role of mediator between two adversaries are discussed.