Recognition as if sovereigns? A procedural understanding of indigenous self-determination

In the last two decades we have witnessed a growing global acknowledgement of indigenous rights – manifested in the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples – challenging the traditional nation-state-centred understanding of political rights and democracy. In this paper, the author argues that indigenous self-determination is to be understood as a way to level the balance of power between indigenous peoples and the nation-states in which they live. Without a solid legal foundation for indigenous peoples to define self-determination in their own languages and to negotiate the conditions of their relation with the nation-states on their own terms, the colonial past (and present) of violent conquest and domination might continue. Indigenous peoples' right to self-determination ought in this perspective to imply recognition of indigenous peoples as having a standing equal to nation-states, i.e. as if they were sovereigns. What self-determination means in political practice would thus be the outcome of negotiations between two (or more) equal political entities. In this way, the right to self-determination has to be interpreted procedurally rather than substantially.     

Republican liberty and border controls

This article examines the normative status of border controls from a neo-republican perspective, grounded in the value of freedom as non-domination. It makes use of Philip Pettit’s account of this kind of freedom and discusses Pettit’s own remarks on the status of border controls. Against Pettit, it argues that the domination generated by border controls is ineliminable given existing political institutions, because such controls cannot avoid subjecting non-citizens to coercion in ways that are not forced to track their interests. The article also argues for an alternative neo-republican account of border controls that does not deny their coerciveness but allows for certain border control policies in non-ideal circumstances.     

Multicultural accommodation and the ideal of non-domination

What normative principles should multicultural states be guided by in responding to minority claims for the accommodation of cultural and religious social practices? This article explores how theories of non-domination can contribute to debates on this question in the multiculturalism literature. It examines Philip Pettit’s, Cecile Laborde’s and Frank Lovett’s republican theories and argues that non-domination-based approaches to multicultural accommodation are more suitable to assess the dynamic of intra- and inter-group relations than the prominent liberal–multiculturalist alternative. However, their advantages are not contingent on the wider theories from which they emerge, but rather related to generalizable features of the non-domination ideal. This suggests that non-domination should also be appealing to non-republicans, who can adopt it minimally as a critical principle to determine illegitimate policies.     

Autonomy as a disposition to non-domination in the work of Mary Wollstonecraft

ABSTRACT

In this paper I argue that there is a notion of autonomy which can be extrapolated from Wollstonecraft’s work: central to this notion is the need for us all to adopt a disposition to non-domination.Thus, an individual is autonomous when she is not dominated but also, how she behaves towards others is significant, for she is only truly autonomous if she does not dominate others. I argue that such a disposition can be read in Wollstonecraft as something which cuts across the public/private divide. It is based on the notion that individuals are always capable of being rational in both of these spheres. There must be a disposition to non-domination because Wollstonecraft demonstrates how domination is corrupting, and when this disposition is lost we find ourselves faced with myriad concerns from slavery to multiple forms of social oppression. Domination creates relations of dependency. It is arbitrary and contingent and makes us relate to each other with a marked lack of compassion. Instead, Wollstonecraft stresses we have a duty to treat others as equals and key to this duty is the need to not dominate others. Finally, I highlight how Wollstonecraft suggests such a disposition is to be gained through education.     

Temporary migration projects and voting rights

Theorists have recently argued that in order to protect migrants from vulnerability and domination, host countries should grant voting rights to all residents, including those who are present on the territory on a temporary visa. Although we endorse the inclusive and egalitarian rationale of this approach, we argue that it is based on the presumption that all migrants aim at permanent inclusion and is therefore inadequate in the case of those who are engaged in ‘temporary migration projects’. We suggest that in order to provide these migrants with a form of political voice that fits their life plans, we need to look at different institutional tools than conventional voting rights, and we point to trade unions and migrant organizations as promising alternatives. We also show that, contrary to what may be thought of other forms of temporary mobility, temporary migration projects and the institutional solutions we propose in order to address the needs of the migrants involved are not disruptive of liberal-democratic institutions.     

驳毛泽东主张“无支配自由”说

毛泽东从未主张过"无支配自由",从未追求过"无支配自由"。说毛泽东主张"无支配自由"并为之奋斗终身,说毛泽东思想与事业的基本主题是"无支配自由",说毛泽东领导中国人民的动力和路标是"无支配自由",说毛泽东"根据无支配自由的根本要求"进行人民民主的"整体构想和具体构建",这是对毛泽东,对毛泽东思想与事业,对马克思主义中国化理论、马克思主义中国化道路的极度歪曲、莫大污蔑。打着毛泽东的旗号鼓吹西方的"无支配自由"论,是极其有害的。