论互联网时代诽谤罪的公诉范围

我国刑法对诽谤罪采取自诉为主、公诉为补充的双轨制模式。由于刑法但书“严重危害社会秩序和国家利益”的公诉依据具有模糊性,同时司法解释本身缺乏解释力和可操作性,存在同义解释、近义解释等问题,加剧了公诉诽谤罪和其他罪名之间的冲突和竞合,特别是当被害人为地方领导干部时,诽谤罪的公诉权在实务中存在被滥用风险,部分限制公诉权的要件在实务中被淡化甚至忽略。从相对狭义的角度看,“严重危害社会秩序和国家利益”只有在行为人对侵犯个体法益具备主观故意,但对侵犯社会法益或国家法益不具备主观故意(或无法证明其具备故意)的情形下,才有其独特的法律适用价值并不与刑法其他罪名相冲突。为妥善处理和平衡诽谤犯罪中惩治犯罪和保障人权的关系,适应互联网时代的内外部变化,建议通过修改我国刑法,将诽谤罪区分为情节不严重、情节严重、情节特别严重的三种形态,为充分保障宪法权利,情节不严重的不作为犯罪处罚;为充分保障自诉权,情节严重的为绝对告诉乃论;为依法惩治犯罪,对符合特定形式要件和实质要件,情节特别严重的诽谤犯罪可以依法公诉,以维护网络信息秩序。     

Defamation in cyberspace: A Japanese perspective

The aim of this paper is two-fold: first, to introduce how Japanese law and its jurisprudence have dealt with the case of on-line defamation, which is arguably one of the most acute problems in modern society, and second, to critically examine the efficacy of such an approach. The recent decision of the Supreme Court in on-line defamation (as oppose to off-line defamation) will be introduced as an exemplar of the way Japanese law and its jurisprudence have dealt with such an acute problem. A first step will be to provide, by way of background, a brief overview of how defamation in a conventional sense has been treated by the Japanese legal system. The second step will be to outline how the Japanese jurisdiction has dealt with on-line defamation, that is to say, to what extent the Japanese court regulates on-line defamatory comments made by the ordinary people. A third step will be to examine the efficacy of such an approach, and the final step will be to examine whether the UK court can learn a lesson from the Japanese jurisdiction. The author will draw upon Japanese jurisprudence, in order to consider whether a valuable lesson might be offered to the UK jurisdiction.     

The European Court of Justice in Bolagsupplysningen: The Brussels I Recast Regulation's jurisdictional rules for online infringement of personality rights further clarified

In the European Union the Brussels Ibis Regulation governs the jurisdiction of Member State courts in civil and commercial matters. The reference for a preliminary ruling coming from the Estonian Supreme Court in the Bolagsupplysningen case offered the European Court of Justice another opportunity to develop its interpretation of the special ground for non-contractual obligations (article 7.2). The European Court of Justice's Grand Chamber ruled that legal persons, like natural persons, have the option of bringing a claim based on the infringement of personality rights by an online publication before the courts of the Member State where their centre of interests is located. It laid down that the centre of interests of a legal person pursuing an economic activity is determined by reference to the place where the company carries out the main part of its economic activities. The victim of a tortious internet publication can only seek an order for rectification and removal of the incorrect information in the courts that have jurisdiction over the entirety of the harm sustained and not before the courts that only enjoy jurisdiction with regard to the damage suffered in their territory.     

From ugly duckling to Swan. The rise of data protection and its limits

This article considers the development of data protection laws from a position on the periphery of legal consciousness to the situation where it is the subject of intensive legal and media publicity. Focusing on the recent controversies surrounding the use of Facebook apps for political purposes, the article will consider the role and limitations of data and privacy protection laws. The question will be posed – if not answered – whether national or regional laws can be effective in what increasingly is a global information society.     

侮辱罪与诽谤罪差异浅论

公民的名誉和人格应该受到国家法律的保护,侮辱、诽谤他人,情节严重的是一种犯罪行为,应受到国家法律的制裁。应以《刑法》为依据,从犯罪的客观特征分析侮辱罪与诽谤罪的主要差别。     

The right to be forgotten: The Israeli version

The right to be forgotten and erase, originally introduced in the well-known case of Google Spain, has caused considerable legal debates on both theoretical and procedural issues. The Israeli Supreme Court has also just recently considered the issue when it was asked to enforce the right to be forgotten of an Israeli advocate, Jonathan Miller, and delist harmful information which appeared in a Google search, and was in truth related to a different adv. Jonathan Miller. The plaintiff relied on the Israeli Prohibition of Defamation Law. Liability was denied on the basis that the information was indeed true, and thus- justified. We suggest in this article that the court should have imposed liability in negligence, an open ended general tort that mainly applies when particular torts fail to supply a reasonable and just solution in new factual situations due to change in social, economic and technological circumstances.     

The liability of website owners for defamation in Israel: A challenge yet to be solved?

From the end of the twentieth century to the present we have witnessed the effects of technology on the way we consume and distribute information. The print media, which in many ways was the natural product of the printing revolution, has given way to the electronic media with websites providing the new “town squares” in which the public discourse is held on political, economic and social issues among others. The Israeli legal system, like the legal systems in other countries, faces a variety of challenges and complex ethical and legal issues when required to regulate (often retrospectively) the manner and processes through which the discourse will be conducted in the virtual “town hall”. In essence, this article focuses on one of the many questions occupying the Israeli legal system and that is whether website owners should be liable in defamation for speech published by third parties on the Internet (through blogs, tweets on Twitter, posts on Facebook,¹ uploaded video clips on YouTube and the like) when no connection exists between the third party and the site owner apart from the fact that the third party has used the website as a platform to publish the offensive speech. The issue of the liability of the website owner has ramifications for the injured party's capacity to institute an action for defamation against the website owner, as often only the latter will be in a position to compensate the injured party (financially) for the offensive speech. The Israeli legal system, which in many ways furnishes a unique and interesting framework for examining the question posed above, as we explain in the body of the article, presents a fascinating example of how the Israeli legislature and the courts have dealt and continue to deal with claims filed against website owners for damage to reputation as a result of speech published by third parties. The article offers a comprehensive review of the status of the right to freedom of speech, anonymity and the right to reputation in Israel, the considerations for and against the imposition of liability on website owners and the latest case law on these questions.     

Mapping Defamation Defences

The general neglect of tort defences is most significant in defamation actions. This paper attempts to reduce to a few guiding principles the numerous, and apparently unrelated, doctrines recognised as defences by the law of defamation. Defining the cause of action as an injury to the claimant's reputation, it argues that they fall into three classes: (i) defences which exclude unlawfulness because the injury was inflicted in pursuance of a right or liberty of the defendant; (ii) defences which exclude blameworthiness because the defendant was not at fault for causing the injury; (iii) defences which relieve the defendant of liability despite the injury being both non iure and negligent: this group, not being underpinned by recognised principles, deserves particular scrutiny. The rule of repetition should be qualified by recognition of a defence of ‘warranted republication’; the remainder should be abolished, being an anachronistic hangover from the old requirement of malice.     

Libel: Its Purpose and Reform

Discussion of libel often fails to define defamation law's purpose and thus properly to assess its value. This article argues that defamation's purpose relates to fundamental human interests in sociality, directly linked to important aspects of human health and well‐being. Protecting such interests is arguably required by the right to private life under ECHR article 8 and should not count as a violation of the right to freedom of speech. Some current reform proposals are criticised as failing to appreciate the importance of protecting sociality. ‘Business’ libel, however, often protects not sociality but purely economic interests. The article therefore argues that the protection of libel law, as opposed to that offered by malicious falsehood and the economic torts, should be withdrawn from purely economic reputation, starting with removing the rights of corporations to sue in defamation, a position compatible with the ECtHR's decision in Karako v Hungary.     

Twitter thou doeth?

Twitter, which started as a micro-blogging website, is the third most popular social network next to Facebook and My Space. Twitter is increasingly becoming primary means of communication among individuals and businesses. It is now being used in courts for issuing injunctions. However, Twitter “tweets” are also potential litigation minefield for lawyers, businesses and employers. As a social-networking tool, the use of Twitter can raise a variety of legal issues such as the right of publicity, breach of confidentiality, privacy infringement, fraud trademark infringement, copyright infringement, reverse username hijacking, among others.