寻租理论与我国的律师收费制度改革

寻租理论对于律师收费改革中的某些消极现象有着较强的解释能力。律师服务收费办法的制定与政府指导价标准的设立是政府对市场调节的一种行政干预,不可避免地导致寻租机会和寻租活动。正确界定政府在法律服务市场中的角色和作用,使其在充分发挥积极作用的同时有效地避免寻租现象的产生,已成为律师收费制度改革的当务之急。     

Governance and transnational civil society: the problem of transnational rent-seeking

The expansion of transnational civil society challenges the regulatory reach of nation-states, both individually and collectively. One regulatory challenge is that transnational civil society organizations (TCSOs) can avail of opportunities to engage in, or facilitate, transnational rent-seeking in ways which benefit a small group of organizations or individuals but which impose significant social costs. This article suggests that certain roles played by TCSOs lend themselves to rent-seeking behaviour and it explores the hypothesis that TCSOs can engage in, or facilitate, transnational rent-seeking where they constitute transnational special interests and/or private transnational authorities. To this end, the article outlines a brief theoretical framework and applies it to case studies of two TCSOs, representing transnational trade associations and industry lobbies, and sports associations and regulators. While the conclusions here are tentative, the article argues for further research including refinement of the theoretical framework and empirical testing.     

公共政策的非公共化:寻租的影响

公共政策作为一种正式的制度安排 ,在解决社会公共问题时应遵循公共利益最大化原则 ,这是公共政策“公共性”的本质属性。但寻租现象的存在往往导致公共政策的非公共化 ,利益集团和一些自利的公职人员以公共利益为代价谋求其特殊利益 ,从而导致公共政策偏离公共利益最大化原则。本文主要运用公共选择理论探讨制度非均衡状态下寻租与公共政策之间的共生关系 ,指出“租”本质上内含于公共政策制定和实施之中 ,寻租破坏了公共政策的公共性 ,又将导致新的制度非均衡。     

价格歧视条件下的企业内部租分析

垄断企业可以借助垄断势力获取超额利润,其内部各部门利用价格歧视也会产生利益,因而各部门也会寻“租”,使制度环境恶化。利用技术手段减少租行为的发生,可以进一步明确“产权”,提高经济效率,从而能够在价格歧视条件下有效减少寻租行为的发生。