The global farms race: land grabs,agricultural investment,and the scramble for food security

In a widely read paper, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, World Bank and others propose systematic property rights formalization as a key step in addressing the problems of irresponsible agricultural investment. This paper examines the case of Cambodia, one of a number of countries where systematic land titling and large-scale land concessions have proceeded in parallel in recent years. Cambodia's experience exemplifies the challenges of the ‘formalization fix’ – the proposition that property formalization constitutes a preferable front-line defense against land grabbing – and highlights formalization's uneven geography as an issue that has yet to generate adequate discussion internationally. Three dimensions of Cambodia's less-than-successful formalization fix efforts stand out: (1) the spatial separation of systematic land titling and agribusiness concessions that emerged during the 2000s and has only recently begun to be addressed; (2) the deployment of property formalization as a means of land grabbing, especially when applied selectively and unevenly; and (3) the political arena of efforts to legitimize ‘state land’. The paper questions the formalization fix as a policy solution, and argues for both greater spatial transparency in property formalization efforts throughout the global South, and greater attention to the problem of unmapped state land in general.     

Is the Sum Greater than the Parts? The Terms of Civil War Peace Agreements and the Commitment Problem Revisited

The dominant theoretical approaches to civil war negotiations in the field of political science have sought to explain both the scarcity and high failure rates of negotiated agreements in civil conflicts. This historical pattern, however, has fundamentally changed in the last two decades as changes in international norms and laws, as well as the increased prevalence and competence of peacebuilding professionals, now require conflict actors to have a greater commitment toward negotiations and the enforcement of agreements. While actors in interstate wars seek to avoid accountability, civil war actors seem to embrace the opportunities that these new dynamics create to achieve broad‐based reforms across numerous areas of policy and government. The result, we suggest, is that stakeholders evaluate agreements based on their potential to accomplish an array of sociopolitical objectives. In addition, for strategic and practical reasons, they perceive that those agreements that include more reforms across multiple policy sectors will have the greatest potential. Our examination of nearly two hundred agreements found evidence that the peacemaking potential of a negotiated agreement between civil war adversaries is greatly enhanced when reforms are pursued across many different policy domains. Conversely, our analysis suggests that the greater the number of policy areas left untouched by a peace agreement, the more likely the stakeholders will be to follow that agreement with additional negotiations to enhance that agreement, or, alternatively, the more likely that violence will resume.     

The Iran nuclear deal: winning a little,losing a lot

Iran’s nuclear programme had for more than a decade become a controversial issue between Iran and the West; it had even threatened to develop into a military confrontation between Teheran and its arch adversary, Washington. The issue was finally resolved in an agreement, after more than a year of negotiations, between the two sides in Geneva in July 2015. This was hailed as a ‘breakthrough’ and a ‘win-win’ for both parties. It is argued here that the nuclear deal has made Iran’s nuclear programme almost inoperable, and pointed out that many members of Congress are vehemently against the deal; the next administration may not honour it or may revise it. The high costs of sanctions against Iran to the sanctioning countries are also examined, with a comparison made between the meagre concessions that Iran will get and the huge concessions that the West will receive under the deal. Furthermore, Iran has acceded to very intrusive inspection of some of its military sites. It is contended that, if the Iranians hope the agreement will soon bring about the resolution of other thorny regional and international issues that exist between Teheran and Washington, they are very likely to be disappointed.     

The Rhythm of the Deal: Negotiation as a Dance

In all the literature on the theory and practice of negotiation, the governing metaphors have been games, war, and fighting. This is true not only for tactical schools of power‐based negotiation but even for more constructive, interest‐based approaches. Our language is infused with talk of tactics, flanks, concessions, gaining ground, and winning. This article explores the possible consequences of abandoning this picture in favor of the less‐explored metaphor of the dance. We argue that both the content and the process of negotiation can change dramatically once we think of bargaining as an aesthetic activity that can provide intrinsic joy as well as extrinsic benefits. Such a “dance” provides plenty of room for competition as well as cooperation, as movements can be spirited and confrontational as well as smooth and harmonious. We identify many forms of dance that can occur within negotiation and explore three: the dance of positioning, where passions and presentations interact proudly; the dance of empathy, when the partners come to better understand each other; and the dance of concessions, where the deal is struck and the music concludes. Finally, we discuss how the dance can be employed pedagogically, in teaching and training negotiation and mediation. In particular, the Brazilian dance of capoeira illustrates holistically and experientially how movement and rhythm can be interpreted both as fighting and as dancing and how we can come to see a process as both aesthetic and purposeful at the same time. First feeling, then thinking, and, finally, speaking, we can use this medium to explore the dynamics of confrontation and cooperation in a negotiation setting.     

矿业权理论研究评述

矿业权是明确矿产归属的物权、可以开发的特许授权和实际开发的企业产权复合而成的权利集合体,矿业权所属的探矿权与采矿权的基本构造与矿业权相同。矿业权是并不存在的权利,国外没有矿业权理论和制度,日本和韩国矿业立法规定的矿业权与我国的矿业权理论完全不同。我国矿业权理论源于对日本矿业权制度的"异化"而影响至今。虚无的矿业权导致我国矿业制度落后于市场经济发展的迫切要求,导致矿业制度的诸多困境、两难。应当撤销虚无的矿业权理论,将矿产物权、特许授权和企业产权三者并列,以此构建现代矿业制度。     

Beyond Offers and Counteroffers: The Impact of Interaction Time and Negotiator Job Satisfaction on Subjective Outcomes in Negotiation

In this study, we examined real‐world sales negotiations by collecting data in collaboration with a large Taiwanese eyeglasses company. We found, as has been established previously, that higher first offers predict higher company profits and that the impact of high opening offers can be muted by greater customer awareness of prices at other stores. When we investigated a more qualitative outcome, customers’ perceptions of service quality, a different set of predictors emerged. Our results indicate that salespeople who spent more time introducing the products and services were perceived by the customers as providing higher service quality, but this effect only occurred for those salespeople who reported high levels of job satisfaction. Also, price reduction by salespeople did not improve customer satisfaction. Our results indicate that customer satisfaction does not require negotiated price concessions, but rather depends on extensive interaction with salespeople who are happy in their work. This is the first study to show that negotiator job satisfaction can affect important negotiation outcomes.     

Why Do We Respond to a Concession with Another Concession? Reciprocity and Compromise

All negotiation processes involve an exchange of concessions, and compromise is an agreement based on mutual concessions. Hence the questions investigated in this article: Why are concessions in negotiations always reciprocal? Why do negotiators follow this rule? And why do negotiators achieve these concessions through a process that we call compromise? Is there a connection between conceding and promising? In this article, I examine the structure of concession making and compromise through sociological, anthropological, and etymological lenses to better illuminate this critical negotiation component.