道德难题与立法选择——法律道德主义立场及实践检讨

传统的法律道德主义者认为国家对道德事务享有判断权,并且在必要时为了保护社会可以动用法律限制公民的道德自由。然而该理论却无法回应"道德民粹主义"和"经验主义"的批评,在此基础上发展出来的新法律道德主义理论尽管精致,但仍然面临着"帕累托挑战"和"权衡难题"。有关法律道德主义的主要争议并不在于道德是否能够入法,而在于其入法的限度和具体方式。中国的立法、执法及司法的各阶段中均存在着不尽相同的法律道德主义形态,隐藏于其背后的"道德的法律强制"值得警惕,我们无法一劳永逸地确定出一条自由社会的道德底线,而注重各种价值之间的权衡却实属重要。     

Normative behaviourism as a solution to four problems in realism and non-ideal theory

ABSTRACT

This article advances the case for ‘normative behaviourism’ – a new way of doing political philosophy that tries to turn facts about observable patterns of behaviour, as produced by different political systems, into grounds for specific political principles. This approach is applied to four distinct problems at the heart of the ideal/non-ideal theory and moralism/realism debates: (1) How to distinguish good from bad idealisations; (2) how to rank options of variable feasibility, cost, and danger; (3) how to distinguish legitimate acceptance of a given political system from acceptance based on coercion or false consciousness; and (4) how to translate abstract principles into concrete institutions. Objections against the general viability of normative behaviourism, and against the types of behaviour it tracks, are also considered.     

论淫秽物品犯罪的惩罚根据与认定标准——走出法益理论一元论的独断

在我国有关淫秽物品的刑事立法中，无论是道德主义、家长主义、自由主义还是女权主义，仅凭一己之力都无法解释复杂的立法现象，多元主义具有相对的合理性。有关淫秽物品的刑事立法是在冒犯原则的基础上考虑禁止剥削理论和软家长主义，法益理论中的损害原则无法为立法提供合理的说明。淫秽物品具有诲淫性的正向特征，没有科学价值或艺术价值的反向特征，这两个正反特征都应主要根据冒犯原则进行理解。     

程颐“理欲之辨”浅析

理欲之辨是中国思想史上的古老命题。程颐承认“人欲”的客观存在,但反对过分的欲望。他认为“人欲”出于“私心”,“天理”出于“道心”,二者不可并存,因此提出“损人欲以复天理”。戴震的一句“以理杀人”为这个被后世非难最多的主张盖棺论定。“存理灭欲”一方面是个人的情感意念从世俗环境中超拔的净化过程,表现出理学道德的纯洁和崇高;另一方面被统治者利用后,被理解为对自然情欲的谴责和对道德教条的屈从,从而大大削弱了理学的道德价值。     

市场经济中的道德与道德主义

发展市场经济不能忽视道德问题，无视道德问题的建设将不可能使市场经济得以健康发展，这是人们的共识。但另一方面我们却有必要区分市场经济中的道德与道德主义，并将此两的界限加以必要的把握。     

Legal moralism and retribution revisited

This is a slightly revised text of Jeffrie G. Murphy’s Presidential Address delivered to the American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division, in March 2006. In the essay the author reconsiders two positions he had previously defended—the liberal attack on legal moralism and robust versions of the retributive theory of punishment—and now finds these positions much more vulnerable to legitimate attack than he had previously realized. In the first part of the essay, he argues that the use of Mill’s liberal harm principle against legal moralism cannot be cabined in such a way as to leave intact other positions that many liberals want to defend—in particular, certain fundamental constitutional rights and character retributivism in criminal sentencing. In the second part of the essay, he expresses serious doubts—some inspired by Nietzsche—about the versions of character retributivism that he had once enthusiastically defended and now describes himself as no more than a “reluctant retributivist.”

夫妻忠实义务与配偶权问题述略——兼评“法律道德主义”的批评

文章认为现行婚姻法修订中 ,应确认夫妻忠实义务和配偶权 ,以体现社会主义法与社会主义道德的协调一致。