Potholes,pensions, and public opinion: the politics of blame in Putin's power vertical

What are the risks and rewards of power centralization in competitive authoritarian regimes, and who in the regime bears those risks and enjoys the rewards? The elimination of gubernatorial elections in Russia in late 2004 provides a unique opportunity to study public reaction to policies that replaced democratically elected regional leaders with Kremlin appointees, thereby further concentrating power in the hands of the central state while simultaneously reducing the level of democratic accountability in Russian politics. Using a 2007 survey of 1500 Russians, it is possible to observe how key measures of public opinion and regime support were influenced by the elimination of gubernatorial elections. Because the timeline of gubernatorial appointments was determined exogenously based on the expiration of elected incumbent governors' terms, by 2007 some regions had governors who still held electoral mandates, while others had Kremlin appointees with no electoral mandate. This quasi experiment allows us to draw surprising conclusions about whom Russians blame – and do not blame – when power becomes increasingly centralized in the hands of the president.