| Abstract: | In most countries the right to publicly perform music is notadministered individually by the copyright holders but rathercollectively by performing rights organizations (PROs). Thecommon explanation behind the proliferation of collective administrationis that some aspects of copyright administrations are naturalmonopolies. It is often argued that individual administrationis impracticable or at least non-economical. Collective administrationis therefore promoted as the most efficient method for licensing,monitoring and enforcing those rights. In addition, becausethe market is a natural monopoly, regulation, rather than anattempt to foster competition, is thought to be the optimalregulatory response. This is the first in a series of two articlesthat critically analyzes this natural monopoly argument. Inthis article I argue that the case for PROs is not as straightforwardas it is assumed to be. I show that many of the underlying costefficiencies that are attributed to PROs are usually simplyassumed and, in many cases, could be equally achieved underless restrictive arrangements. |
