| Abstract: | Abstract The articles in this symposium present various consequences that effectively result in changes from adopted budgets during the implementation phase, which derive from institutional structure. The institutional structures referred to include such attributes as internal policy, procedural methodology, longevity in office, and reward and incentive systems related to performance outcomes For local governments, structural influences studied include changes in leadership in the executive and legislative branches, longevity in office of budget administrators, and differences related to mayor-council vs. council-manager forms of government. Internal policies reported on cover methodology used to forecast revenues such as quantitative methods versus informed judgment, budgetary controls and spending policy related to mandated spending beyond local government control, and procedures for benchmarking within the agency as well as with peer groups and professional standards. Consortia of governments are referenced regarding performance evaluation as is the process for gaining consensus between the executive and legislative branches, including expert outside opinion. Other influences on performance outcomes reported on are those tied to the risk-reward system built in to the institutional structure, which includes risk tolerance of the individuals who make pension fund investments. |
