Some Remarks on the Notions of Legal Order and Legal System

Abstract
In this paper, the authors discuss some problems related to the existence and identity of legal norms and legal systems. Firstly, two criteria for identification of legal norms are analyzed: linguistic criteria and non-linguistic criteria. Secondly, the dynamics of legal systems and the distinction between legal system and legal order are examined (close to Raz's distinction between momentary legal system and legal system). Based on the logical relations of membership and inclusion, two ways of analysing the change of legal systems are suggested. Thirdly, a criterion for identification of legal orders (from Bulygin) is discussed and it is shown that this criterion does not explain adequately, on the one hand, the existence of some norms, i.e., customary norms; and, on the other, the existence of invalid norms; i.e., unconstitutional norms. The main conclusions of this paper are: (a) the concepts of legal system and legal order could not explain the existence of law in a given society; (b) the concepts of legal system and legal order could be considered models of rational normative systems.