Resources and Rent Seeking in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

By examining the Congolese political economy through the lens of the ‘resource curse’ theory, this article aims to advance our understanding of the chronic underdevelopment of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Proceeding in three distinct phases the article examines the effect of resource rents, foreignn aid and the likely effect of Chinese investment. It finds that a political tradition of patrimonialism and corruption based on large inflows of easily corruptible resource rents was established in the Mobutu period. In the post-conflict period the source of revenue shifted from resource rents to foreign aid, while the political tradition remained essentially unchanged. The model of the Congolese political economy established in these first two sections will then be used to make an informed assessment of the Sicomines deal. The article finds that the structured nature of the deals means that it is unlikely to perpetuate the ‘resource curse’ condition.