At the Commission's Discretion: Cartelbusting and Fining Infringements Under the EU's Restrictive Practices Policy

Although the last decade has seen an increased interest from political science in many aspects of EU competition policy the issue of cartelbusting has been almost totally neglected. This is a curious situation given that this remains by far the major aspect of the European Commission's activities in the competition arena. By merging the available, albeit extremely limited, public administration and policy studies literature with the legal literature the article endeavours to begin to redress the balance by examining the EU's restrictive practices policy. It pays particular attention to the European Commission and its Directorate General responsible for com-petition policy (DGIV) and their activities in their enduring war against cartels. At its core this article analyses the Commission's quasi-judicial authority in relation to cartel arrangements, identifies the extent to which the decision-making process is open to substantial degrees of administrative discretion within DGIV and makes specific reference to its policy on fining infringements.