Dodging Dodd‐Frank: Excessive Speculation,Commodities Markets,and the Burden of Proof

Inspired by the wave of regulatory rulemaking, which followed the 2008 financial crisis and the passage of the Dodd‐Frank Act, this article examines the efforts of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission to implement one such rule: Rule 76 FR 4752. Born of concerns with the impact of financial speculators on commodities prices, the rule calls for the expanded use of position limits to control “excessive speculation” in US commodities markets. In documenting the political and legal life of this rule from its roots in policy reports through to its suspension by a federal judge, the article explores the place of “evidence” in the rulemaking process. Particular attention is devoted to the growing evidentiary burden placed on financial regulators who are expected to frame market problems in terms of quantitative, price‐based forms of harm. In the case of position limits, this has involved statistical analyses of the causal connections between excessive speculation and commodities prices and the use of a single statistical test: Granger causality. By examining the parameters and limitations of this test, the article offers a valuable window into the unique challenges of financial regulation and their roots in questions of knowledge, evidence, and proof.