| Abstract: | ABSTRACT Having analyzed the different strategies used in the 1998 and 2002 parliamentary election campaigns with reference to the 1990 and 1994 campaigns, we can conclude that the Hungarian election conventions and culture are still in a state of experimentation and exploration. In contrast with American election traditions, in Hungary, not the individual (with the exception of the Alliance of Young Democrats), but the party image is what counts, though, in this respect, considerable changes could be observed during the last few years. The Hungarian political palette is much too fragmented, and this sets a barrier to the necessary desire for creating a suitable forum for the debate of the party leaders and for the declaration of party politics. At present, the party programme reaches the citizens just in implicit, hidden, often symbolic forms of messages. While the symbols of the left-wing parties were sketchy, unskillful, too rational, and not giving much space for emotional influence, the right-wing parties gave too large of a dose of different symbols, which were emotional rather than rational. This lack of balance made the campaigns superficial, irrational, sometimes misleading, and abnormal. This feeling of abnormality was strengthened by the fact that the overdose on the part of the right wing was not limited to the campaign period, but the emotional shocking started much earlier. The state of excitement, which was spread in time, actually started in the spring of 1998, and even if there were fluctuations, the general mood of the last four years was characterised by the dug-out hatchet. The political opinion of the Orbán party was clearly expressed by their metaphors. The message of the sentences like 'it is more than change of government, less than change of regime,' 'attacking on the whole field,' 'we change the telephone directories,' etc., was unambiguous: combative four years are coming. During their campaign, 'setting up a record' was realized between the two rounds after the failure in the first round and was still going on showing the election failure, which came about in democratic circumstances (Galló Béla, 2002, 93). One could hardly judge the effectiveness of agenda building, though some of the crucial social questions appeared as cue words and sentences in the mediated messages of parties (for example, family, health care, education, joining the European Union). Hungarian campaigning, compared to the American presidential election campaign, is colorless and rife with technical and rhetorical errors, and it is a competition without any coherence where the citizen is very often just a means of, but not the goal in, the struggle of the parties. |
