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The Line‐Item Veto in Georgia: Fiscal Restraint or Inter‐Branch Politics?
Authors:THOMAS P. LAUTH  CATHERINE C. REESE
Abstract:This article about use of the line‐item veto in Georgia concludes that the item veto has been used not as an instrument for reducing the budget total or the size of state government, but as an instrument for protecting the executive budget. Using appropriations data and drawing upon interviews with participants in the budget process, including seven governors, the authors present evidence that in Georgia the item veto (1) is not frequently used, (2) when used, is more likely to remove legislative language than delete dollar amounts, and (3) enables the spending priorities and fiscal policy preferences of the governor to prevail as state policy.
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