Could There be a Right to Own Intellectual Property? |
| |
Authors: | James Wilson |
| |
Institution: | (1) Centre for Philosophy, Justice and Health and Comprehensive Biomedical Research Centre, University College London, London, UK |
| |
Abstract: | Intellectual property typically involves claims of ownership of types, rather than particulars. In this article I argue that
this difference in ontology makes an important moral difference. In particular I argue that there cannot be an intrinsic moral
right to own intellectual property. I begin by establishing a necessary condition for the justification of intrinsic moral
rights claims, which I call the Rights Justification Principle. Briefly, this holds that if we want to claim that there is an intrinsic moral right to φ, we must be able to show that (a)
violating this right would typically result in either a wrongful harm or other significant wrong to the holder of the right,
and (b) the wrongful harm or other wrong in question is independent of the existence of the intrinsic right we are trying
to justify. I then argue that merely creating a new instance of a type is not the kind of action which can wrongfully harm
the creator of that type. Insofar as there do seem to be wrongs involved in copying a published poem or computer program,
these wrongs presuppose the existence of an intrinsic right to own intellectual property, and so cannot be used to justify
it. I conclude that there cannot be an intrinsic right to own intellectual property. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|