European integration from the agency theory perspective |
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Authors: | J. Andrés Faíña Antonio García-Lorenzo Jesús López-Rodríguez |
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Affiliation: | 1. Jean Monnet Chair in European Industrial Economics, University of A Coru?a, A Coru?a 2. Department of Economic Analysis and Business Administration, University of A Coru?a Jesús López-Rodríguez, A Coru?a
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Abstract: | European integration is a process in which national governments look for higher levels of integration and promote new requests for allocations from the supranational authority while the balance between the benefits and costs of the supranational collective action becomes increasingly favourable. This process may be analyzed as an agency problem where different national governments, acting as principals, try to lead a single agent—the supranational authority—to make a decision on the level of integration. In this paper, decisions on integration of equilibrium are studied as the result of a non co-operative two-stage game, where national governments outline their political support strategies in the first stage and the supranational authority decides the level of integration in the second stage. JEL Classification D72 |
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Keywords: | European integration Agency theory Benefits and costs of integration |
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