Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts |
| |
Authors: | Robert Cooter Winand Emons |
| |
Institution: | (1) School of Law (Boalt Hall), University of California Berkeley, CA 94720, USA;(2) Department of Economics, University of Bern, Gesellschaftsstrasse 49, CH-3012 Bern, Switzerland |
| |
Abstract: | In trials witnesses often gain by slanting their testimony. The law tries to elicit the truth from witnesses by cross-examination under threat of criminal prosecution for perjury. As a truth-revealing mechanism, perjury law is crude and ineffective. We develop a perfect truth-revealing mechanism, which exactly offsets the gain from slanted testimony by the risk of a possible sanction. Witnesses testify voluntarily under the mechanism. Implementing an effective truth-revealing mechanism requires a witness to certify accuracy by posting bond. If events subsequently prove that the testimony was inaccurate, the witness forfeits the bond. By providing superior incentives for telling the truth, truth-bonding could combat some distortions by factual witnesses and interested experts, including junk science. |
| |
Keywords: | litigation witness truth-revealing mechanism perjury |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|