民主政治的产业组织与政治企业家理论

以Hotelling-Downs传统为基础的政治竞争的投票模型忽视了民主政治的复杂结构。本文在Tullock自然垄断特许权竞标的民主模型、Niskanen官僚政治模型以及Weingast-Marshall立法委员会组织模型基础上分析民主政治的产业组织。由于存在不完全信息和不完全契约以及较高的交易成本等所导致的政治市场的内在无效率,民主政治的产业组织为政治企业家提供了策略性活动的空间。政治企业家的策略性活动有助于理解经济政策的制定和制度变迁的过程。研究民主政治的产业组织将为探索内生于政治过程的政治企业家理论提供一条可行的路径。

The Industrial Organization of Democracy and Theory of Political Entrepreneur

The voting model of political competition based on the tradition of Hotelling-Downs neglected the complex structure of democracy.This article analyzes the industrial organization of democracy on the basis of democracy model bidding for licensed Tullock natural monopoly,Niskanen bureaucratic politics and organizational model of Weingast-Marshall legislative council. Due to the inherent inefficiency of political market caused by incomplete information and contract and a higher contraction cost,the industrial organization offers strategic action space for the political entrepreneur,which helps to understand the establishment of economic policies and structural change.The study of the industrial organization will provide a feasible way for the exploration of the theory of the political entrepreneur inherent in political process.