The servant of two masters: Electoral incentives in the Scottish Parliament |
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Authors: | Martin Battle |
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Affiliation: | Political Science Department, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo, CA, USA |
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Abstract: | Scholars have pointed out the potential impact of different electoral systems on the incentives for representatives to cultivate personal versus party reputations. The mixed-member proportional system (MMP) allows us to examine the effects of electoral systems on legislators’ incentives. Scholars have argued that MMP may be the ‘best of both worlds’; however, MMP may lead to competing demands on list representatives if they are also allowed to run as constituency candidates, as happens in the Scottish Parliament. I show that this leads to different levels of committee activity—which I use as a surrogate for party activity—from constituency Members of Scottish Parliament (MSPs), pure-list MSPs (who are elected via the party list and do not run in constituencies), and dual-candidate list MSPs (list MSPs who also run in constituencies), and that the proximity of elections also affects committee activity for those who run in constituencies. |
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Keywords: | Electoral systems representation personal vote personalization of politics mixed-member system Scottish Parliament |
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