Non-Electoral Accountability in Global Politics: Strengthening Democratic Control within the Global Garment Industry

This article challenges the widespread view that democraticaccountability is unattainable in global politics because ofthe impracticality of establishing global elections. Instead,it argues that global democratic accountability can potentiallybe achieved by instituting non-electoral mechanisms that performequivalent accountability functions through more workable institutionalmeans. This argument is defended at a theoretical level, andfurther illustrated by analysing an empirical case study ofthe institutions through which labour standards in the globalgarment industry are determined. The article first explainswhy electoral mechanisms are no longer a viable means for achievingdemocratic accountability in political contexts such as theglobal garment industry, that are characterized by the decentralizeddispersion of public decision-making power among a range oforganizationally disparate state and non-state actors. It thenidentifies the key democratic function of electoral accountabilityas that of ensuring a reasonable degree of public control overpublic decision-making, and argues that this normative functioncan, in principle, be legitimately performed through non-electoralas well as electoral mechanisms. Finally, it elaborates thekey institutional features of a legitimate framework of non-electoralaccountability – public transparency and public disempowerment– and illustrates how these functions could potentiallybe achieved in practice, with reference to the example of theglobal garment industry.