Intergouvernementale Beziehungen und Fiskalpolitik in Bundesstaaten

This article is dedicated to the question if and how federal structures have an influence on decisions in fiscal policy. In order to answer this question four countries are selected as case studies that represent on the one hand a more competitive model (Canada, Belgium) and on the other hand a more cooperative model (Germany, Switzerland). We want to know which effect and disturbing potential federal structures in these countries could have on fiscal policy making and if the distinction of federal types explains variations in decision making. The focus will be on intergovernmental relations in fiscal policy making, i.e. the possibility to act of the federal government in the light of the veto-power of member states and parties. The result is: federal structures have in general, without differences according to the type of federalism, a constraining influence for keynesian demand management. They also have, though in different ways, a potential negative influence on deficit reduction. This negative influence can, however, be neutralised by intended and unintended mechanisms which differ between countries.