| Abstract: | Abstract. That the European Union is in a state of constitutional engagement speaks both to an obvious and urgent truth and to a less obvious but ultimately even more significant possibility. Patently, and of immediate import, with the process of national ratification in full flow following the signing of the Constitutional Treaty in Rome in October 2004—the fruit of the deliberations and negotiations of the Convention on the Future of Europe (2002–3) and the Intergovernmental Conference (2003–4)—the new union is presently in the pre-nuptial phase, and displaying many of the signs of pre-nuptial tension. Notwithstanding the legal convolutions of some of the engagement's most ardent supporters, the marriage cannot take place unless and until all twenty five member states have signalled their consent in accordance with national constitutional requirements. These requirements are diverse, and in ten cases have been interpreted as involving either a binding or an advisory referendum. And following the reaction of the June 2005 European Council to the French and Dutch "ho" votes, we will have to wait until at least 2007 for the marriage to be solemnized. As with so many engagements, therefore, there is however a strong possibility that the whole thing will be called off at the last minute. The consequences of failure would be not insignificant for the European Union, but perhaps not as significant as some fear and others hope. In what follows, by investigating instead the deeper meaning and the longer-term ambition of Europe's constitutional engagement, I seek to demonstrate that, although clearly an important variable, the ratification of this particular Treaty at this particular moment is neither necessary to nor sufficient for the realization of the EU's full constitutional potential, but that the secular process which such an initiative reflects is of vital significance. |
