From primary goods to capabilities to well-being

Amartya Sen’s The Idea of Justice (2009 Sen, A. 2009. The idea of justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) mistakenly characterizes transcendental accounts of justice as being unable to compare non-ideal alternatives, and thus misfires as a criticism of Robert Nozick and John Rawls. In fact, Nozick’s disinterest in when rights may be overridden does not bespeak indifference to specific questions of comparative assessment, and Lockean rights do give determinate advice in everyday circumstances. Sen correctly reports that Rawls’s theory is defective at giving practical normative advice, but the basic problem is the over-rigidity of Rawls’s absolute priority relations, not transcendentalism. Sen’s search for a complete moral theory requires that he produce one. Act consequentialism is one promising complete theory of justice, having both transcendental grounding and clear methods for comparative assessment. I also propose moving from Sen’s capabilities standard of social justice to one based on functioning. The latter facilitates distinguishing between trivial and worthless capabilities and important and worthwhile ones, and focuses social justice more squarely on the end of well-being.