| Abstract: | In March 2005, institutional investors forced Deutsche Börse AG to withdraw its takeover bid for the London Stock Exchange, followed some time later by the resignation of both the enterprise’s CEO and supervisory board. This event highlights in an exemplary manner the transformation of joint-stock companies in Germany from insider systems towards systems including both insiders and outsiders and the related transformation of their corporate governance. The conflict between Deutsche Börse AG’s principals and agents demonstrates, first of all, the hybridization of different governance systems. Contrary to assumptions speaking of ?path dependency“ or a convergence of the different varieties of capitalism in the direction of the US model of market-based capitalism, the conflict concerning Deutsche Börse AG underlines the typical example of a transformation displaying path dependencies and convergences at the same time. Secondly, it is demonstrated that the enterprises’ market opening will not necessarily involve stronger market control, but that this process instead evokes new options for corporate policy governance. |
