POLITICS AND REGULATION: THE PUBLIC CHOICE APPROACH

Abstract: Government regulation of the economy has been the subject of criticism both on the grounds of efficiency and equity. Traditional economic theories explaining regulation may be deficient insofar as they assume a benevolent welfare maximizing government, intervening only to correct "market failures". Political theories of interest group influence (for example pluralist, capture, Marxist theories) provide some more realistic insights into regulation, but fail to yield rigorous, testable propositions. The theory of public choice applies the rigour of economic analysis to political behaviour and suggests some useful approaches to the explanation of regulation, focusing on the public goods problem of organizing large groups of actors for collective action and on the role of the political entrepreneur in mobilizing large numbers of voters. The public choice approach may also be useful in suggesting strategies for deregulation in some key areas of the Australian economy currently under scrutiny (for example banking, airlines, telecommunications).